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Abstract

The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) has become an indispensable Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) source. This makes GNSS availability and
reliability increasingly more important to our nation’s warfighting capability. GNSS
technology has also become ubiquitous across a variety of civilian industries and sectors making it essential for modern civilization. Due to the overwhelming importance
of GNSS, spoofing and methods that degrade the system’s performance are on the
rise. This is creating a need to have a civilian approach to authenticate GNSS signals.
Delayed Authentication System (DAS) offers civilian solutions to GNSS signal authentication by providing confidence in a receiver’s PNT solution. Unlike military or
otherwise encrypted GNSS signals, civilian signals are susceptible to signal spoofing.
Civilian GNSS capability is also sufficient for certain applications where incorporating cryptographic technology for tracking military signals is too cost prohibitive, or
the receiver is disposable – which precludes embedding sensitive technology. The
methods presented in this thesis focus on the feasibility of implementing DAS using
currently available civilian GNSS receiver equipment.
DAS aims to provide civilian signal authentication by detecting the presence of
encrypted signal components in the received GNSS signal. DAS is compatible with
all GNSS constellations that have an open signal and an encrypted signal. In a GNSS
signal, the encrypted chips and the civilian chips are transmitted synchronously in
orthogonal phases. Therefore, by tracking the civilian signal, the encrypted signal’s
chips can be estimated. In a matter of seconds, the estimated encrypted signal’s
chips from the reference receiver will then be timestamped, stored, and packaged for
transmission to participating receivers within the system. The participating receivers
iv

will then correlate the transmitted received chips from the reference receiver to the
chips that were timestamped and stored on the participating receiver.
The results presented offer significant advancements toward civilian signal authentication. This research provides a proof-of-concept to produce a low-cost authentication system for all GNSS signals using a simulated receiver with both simulated
data and live-sky data. It covers the methodology as well as the minimum resource
requirements for DAS and the analysis of the simulations.

v
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Delayed Authentication System for Civilian Satellite Navigation Receivers with
Currently Existing Signals

I. Introduction

1.1

Problem Background
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) are responsible for providing precise

Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) solutions and have become essential for
many users around the globe. The ubiquity of GNSS is due to rapid technological
advances combined with innovative uses of satellite navigation (satnav). Many civilian
receivers are optimized for different market segments and are designed assuming that
the received signals have been subjected to the normal interferences or have minimal
mitigations implemented. Since its inception, a growing array of threats have been
emerging with the overwhelming importance of GNSS throughout the world. This
is made easier to accomplish due to the very low received signal power from GNSS.
One such threat to receivers is spoofing. Spoofing allows hackers to interfere directly
with the accuracy of the receiver’s PNT solution. In cases where the PNT accuracy
could cause harm, receivers should be aware of the current signal’s authenticity. The
Delayed Authentication System (DAS) seeks to provide confidence in the signal’s
authenticity allowing the receiver to be able to continue to perform as expected should
a non-authentic signal be detected. DAS would accomplish this by giving the receiver
the ability to continue to operate safely if a signal is deemed inauthentic by ignoring
signals from that source.
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1.1.1

Operational Motivation

For military applications, having reliable and trustworthy GNSS signals is of
paramount importance. In the case of the United States, the US Military developed the Global Positioning System (GPS) to meet its critical mission needs for all
battlespaces. The US military uses GPS in many operations ranging from search and
rescue missions, precision missile launches, reconnaissance missions, and guidance of
unmanned systems. During Operation Desert Shield in 1990, GPS demonstrated its
military capabilities and has ever since been a crucial asset to the modern warfighter.
Consequentially, GPS’s success has caused foreign agents to develop spoofing techniques to support their operational goals [1]. Although there are military methods
to mitigate spoofing, it is desirable to explore alternative methods of authentication
using non-military equipment. This is because the military equipment requires keying, key management, and securing the technology against tampering. Additionally,
these receivers are expensive and not likely to be used in applications where the receiver is disposable, or recovery is not feasible. This research will allow for broader
applications of signal authentication techniques.

1.1.2

Civilian Motivation

Many civilian applications depend on the integrity of GNSS signals and are responsible for $70 billion to the US economy annually [2]. A few major applications
that rely on GNSS include precision aircraft landing and approach, finance and banking transactions, cargo shipping lanes, power grid synchronization, cellular networks,
autonomous navigation, railway operations, survey, and precision agriculture. Spoofing of GNSS for the civilian sector can have drastic economic results. For example,
introducing a spoofed signal into a financial system could enable cyber-theft or fraud.
Due to the competitive nature in the civilian market and resistance to high imple-
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mentation costs, DAS aims to provide a signal authentication system at a low cost
with currently available equipment.

1.1.3

Work Currently in Progress

The ability to generate synthetic versions of GNSS signals can be attributed to
two reasons: the civilian GNSS signal’s structure is public knowledge and portions
of the encrypted GNSS signal’s structure are also publicly known. Due to the availability of the signal structures and the increase of spoofing, numerous papers have
been published describing methods to counteract potential spoofing attempts. These
concentrate on methods for a receiver to infer the signal’s legitimacy by observing
aspects of the signal’s physical manifestation or tying cryptographic methods into
the civilian signal [3]. Two methods that are currently being added to the GNSS signal structures are Chips-Message Robust Authentication (CHIMERA) for the GPS
L1C signal and Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OS-NMA) signal
for Galileo. Although these methods provide authenticity for that GNSS’s signals,
they are still not fully operational. These systems will take time to be available with
a full constellation allowing these operational systems to be vulnerable to spoofing.
Therefore, a solution is needed to authenticate GNSS signals with currently available
signals while also being compatible with multiple GNSS signals.

1.2

Research Objectives
The goal of this research is to demonstrate a proof-of-concept authentication sys-

tem using a functioning software GNSS receiver that can authenticate the received
signal by exploiting the known signal structures. Therefore, values of the encrypted
signals can be estimated by tracking the civilian signal even though the signals are
encrypted. This research investigates whether authentication is achievable due to
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the known relationship between the spreading sequence rates of civilian signals and
encrypted signals for all satnav signals. For example, these chipping rates are always
related by an integer relationship. Additionally, civilian signals and encrypted signals
are synchronous and normally transmitted orthogonally to each other.
For this research, the objective is to estimate the encrypted chip values while
tracking the civilian component. This is achieved by synchronization of the carrier
phase and time of the open signals using code tracking. The code tracking is accomplished by using the civilian code generator to determine the boundaries of the
encrypted signal. Once the code boundaries are aligned, the start of the chip sequence can be properly estimated. The boundaries can then be used to estimate the
encrypted signal’s chips for which they can be time stamped and stored locally. DAS
is designed using a reference station (RS) and a participating user(s) (PU). A RS
uses a high gain antenna and estimates a sequence of chips corresponding to a time
interval. The PU performs the same operation for the same interval. The sequence
produced by the RS is henceforth known as Reference Authentication Vector (RAV).
Similarly, the PU that does not use a high gain antenna estimates a sequence of chips
corresponding to a time interval. The sequence produced by the PU is henceforth
known as Estimated Authentication Vector (EAV). Authenticity of the signal can be
determined by sending the estimated encrypted signal from the RS and correlating
with the estimated encrypted signal on the PU. Due to DAS requiring the use of
encrypted chips, the system is still unclassified because the encrypted chips become
‘declassified’ once they leave the satellite. Hence this method is not considered sensitive or somehow going around the system’s design. It also still maintains military
exclusivity (i.e. if the civil signal is denied, DAS stops working). A simplified drawing
of DAS can be viewed in Figure 1 to get a visual representation of the system.
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Figure 1: Delayed Authentication System Overview: This Figures shows an Authentic
GNSS signal is being received by the RAV receiver which is sending the estimated
encrypted chips through a side-channel to the EAV receivers. The EAV receivers
are receiving either Authentic GNSS signals or Non-Authentic GNSS signals to be
correlated with the estimated encrypted chips from the RAV receiver.
The scope of this thesis and some assumptions are as follows:
 Assume the RS is receiving an Authentic GNSS signal
 The RS sends data to the participating receiver through a side-channel
 Assume the PU is not receiving a repeated authentic GNSS signal
 Determine the memory requirement for the PU
 Determine the Authentication Vector length required
 Determine the correlation threshold for an Authentic GNSS signal
 Show that the PU can determine GNSS signal authenticity
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1.3

Document Overview
The GNSS signal and structure design, the DAS focused research, and signal

structure will be described in Chapter II. Chapter III will detail the software receiver
architecture used to track and align the civilian signals with the encrypted military
signals to estimate the encrypted military signal’s chips. Chapter IV will exhibit the
system’s performance using simulated data as well as live-sky data. Lastly, Chapter V
will present interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations based on the Thesis
research.
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II. Background and Literature Review

2.1

Chapter Overview
The goal of this chapter is to provide the reader with background information

about some important topics that are either used in this research or discussed. This
chapter discusses the basics of satellite navigation (satnav) signals, receiver front-end
and signal tracking. An overview of the satnav signal structure is provided for Global
Positioning System (GPS) L1, Galileo and Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya
Sistema (GLONASS) L1 to support the research in this thesis. Receiver operating
characteristics are discussed including Signal-to-Noise ratio (SNR), carrier-to-noise
ratio (CNR), link budget, antenna gain, and the functionality of the receiver frontend. This chapter also discusses signal authentication schemes that have already been
researched and an overview on how the encrypted signals are estimated for Delayed
Authentication System (DAS).

2.2

Satnav Signal Structure
This research focuses on the use of GPS L1 signals to determine the proof-

of-concept for DAS. With a focus on legacy GPS, there are two classes of codes:
Coarse-Acquisition (C/A) and precise (P) codes using Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) for legacy signals transmission [4]. While the GPS L1 C/A code is
more likely available to the public, the encrypted P(Y) code is restricted for military
applications.
C/A code is represented as gold code in the Pseudorandom Noise (PRN) code
family. Transmitting signals on the L1 frequency band, C/A code generates a center
of frequency of 1575.42 MHz [5]. C/A code is used to obtain initial acquisition of the
GPS signal at a lower chipping rate of 1.023x106 chips per second with a period of
7

1023 chips. Each chip in the C/A code has a range of 293.0 meters. As a result, it
takes 1 millisecond to repeat the code, and it is also easier to lock onto C/A code. As
transmitted from the satellite, GPS L1 C/A code is represented as in Equation (1)
[4]:

AC/A CA(t)N (t)sin(ω1 t)

(1)

In contrast to C/A code, GPS L1 P(Y) code transmits at higher chipping rate of
10.23x106 chips per second with a period of 6.19x101 2 chips. Therefore, it takes one
week to repeat the P code [4]. Both C/A and P codes transmit signals on L1 frequency
band centered at 1575.42 MHz [5]. Moreover, each chip in the P code corresponds
to a length of 29.30 meters. Thus, it is more difficult and requires accurate timing
information to lock onto P code. However, P code is available to the public when it is
initially released. In order to prevent unauthorized interference, P code is encrypted
and known as P(Y) code. Then, the encrypted P(Y) code becomes classified and
cannot be either directly locked onto or spoofed by unauthorized users. Therefore,
C/A code is being used for civilian signals while P(Y) code is strictly used for military
signals. Figure 2 represents the legacy GPS L1 C/A code and P(Y) code [4].
C/A code and P code are modulated by Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK). That
means they are in quadrature phase in which C/A-code is 90° out of phase from P(Y)
code. This characteristic is shown as in equation (2) below [4]:

APL1 Y (t)N (t)cos(ω1 t)

(2)

N (t) represents the navigation message modulated on both codes and transmitted
at 50 bits per second (bps). The amplitudes of L1P code signal (AP L1 ) and C/A code
signal (AC/A ) are -163 dBW and -160 dBW, respectively. ω1 is the frequency of the
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Figure 2: GPS Signals L1 [6].
corresponding code [4].
In addition to P(Y) code, a new military signal called M code is designed on
block IIR-M satellites to improve the security of the military GPS signals. M code
is in the same GNSS system – GPS as C/A and P(Y) codes. That means M code
uses CDMA for its legacy signals transmission and is transmitted in the GPS L1
whose frequency band is also centered at 1575.42 MHz [5]. M code has a higher
code frequency than C/A code but lower compared to P(Y) code. M code’s code
frequency is 5.115 MHz [5]. If P(Y) code requires to lock onto C/A code first, M
code is designed for autonomous acquisition. Therefore, M-code is useful to improve
the anti-jamming GPS signals [7]. The spectrum of GPS signals of M code is also
illustrated in Figure 2.
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Furthermore, GLONASS is another modernized Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) system used and owned by the Russian Ministry of Defense. The
GLONASS project first started in mid-1970s. By 2010, GLONASS consisting of 21
active satellites and 3 active spares completely achieved full coverage of Russia’s territory. In contrast to GPS signals, GLONASS signals containing standard precision
and high precision services use frequency division multiple access (FDMA) technique.
GLONASS signals include two classes of codes – C/A and P codes which are transmitted on both L1 and L2 frequency bands. In comparison with GPS L1, GLONASS
L1’s frequency band is centered at (1598.0625-1605.375) MHz ± 0.511 MHz. If C/A
code transmits signals with a code frequency at 0.511 MHz on L1 band, P code signal
transmission rate is higher at 5.11 MHz. Unlike the legacy GPS P code that repeats
only once a week, GLONASS P code repeats every second. Figure 3 is the spectra of
GLONASS signals in L1 band [8].
Generally, GLONASS rejects interference better compared to other GNSS systems. GLONASS has a better cross-correlation interference at -48 dB while GPS’s
cross-correlation is -21.6 dB. Furthermore, both GLONASS and GPS transmit navigation message at the rate of 50 bps although their navigation message lengths are
different, 2.5 and 12.5 minutes for GLONASS and GPS, respectively. Nevertheless,
receiver designers are still facing difficulties to design the inter-channel biases due
to FDMA, such as costs. To successfully operate, it requires that a front-end group
delay corresponding to each channel be determined [9]. Figure 4 below represents the
comparison of the spectra of GPS and GLONASS signals in L1 band.
With a desire to be independent from foreigner signals including the United States
(US) GPS signals and GLONASS system by Russian government, the European Union
(EU) created their own global navigation satellite system called Galileo. Galileo signal
plan is expected to provide an independent and high precision positioning system
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Figure 3: GLONASS Signals in L1 Band [8].
for the EU. The three signals E1, E5, and E6 are the code division multiple access
CDMA and right-hand circularly polarized (RHCP) signals transmitted by the Galileo
satellites. This research specifically focuses on the usage of the E5 band which has two
sub-signals referred as E5a and E5b. The E5 frequency band is centered at 1191.795
MHz, and the spreading modulation for E5 Alt-BOC has a code rate of 10.23 MHz
with a sub-carrier frequency of 15.345 MHz. As sub-signals, both E5a and E5b also
have pilot and data signal components. E5a and E5b then can be processed separately
with BPSK(10) replica. Besides, the minimum received power for both E5a and E5b
bands is -155 dBW. If the primary PRN code length of E5 is 10230, the secondary
PRN code lengths are 20, 100, 4, and 100 for E5a data, E5a pilot, E5b data, and E5b
pilot, respectively. In which, the data rates are specified as 50 sps for E5a data and
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Figure 4: Spectra of GPS and GLONASS Signals in L1 Band [8].
250 sps for E5b data. The spectra of Galileo signals in E5 band is illustrated as in
Figure 5 below [5].
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Figure 5: Spectra of Galileo Signals E5 [7].
2.3

Overview of Receiver Signal Processing
This section provides an overview of aspects of the receiver signal processing that

are key to implementing DAS. This section focuses on the minimum link budget
expected for a typical receiver as well as a high-level receiver description. This section
also provides background information on carrier and code tracking as well as the
relationship between SNR and C/N0 .
2.3.1

Link Budget, Minimum SNR

To be able to recover transmitted information, it requires a minimum amount of
SNR at the receiver which is often known as link budget. Technically, there are two
13

link budget analyses that are of concern: the uplink and downlink. The uplink budget
requires from ground to satellite while the downlink budget calculates signal power
from satellite to ground. That means link budget calculates signal gains and losses
from the transmitter, the propagation medium to the receiver [10].
Typically, on GPS Standard Positioning Service (SPS) L1 coarse acquisition C/A
code, the minimum GPS received signal power is -159 dBW. Specifically, the radiated
power needed is 14 dBW, the space vehicle (SV) gain is +11 dB in average, and the
receive antenna gain is +1 dB. Yet, the free space loss is -158 dB, the atmospheric
loss is -2 dB, and the power incident on isotropic antenna or the space loss factor is
-25 dB. Another factor to consider is the thermal noise power at the GPS receiver,
which is calculated as [11]:

σn2 = kB Tef f Bef f

(3)

In which, kB is the Boltzmann’s constant of 1.38x10−23 Joules/Kelvin, Tef f is
the front-end effective noise temperature of 295 K, and Bef f is the receiver front-end
bandwidth which is usually 24 MHz for monitoring receivers [11].
Then, the SNR is calculated as:

SN R =

SignalP ower
N oiseP ower
(4)

SN R =

SignalP ower
kB Tef f Bef f

Normally, the thermal noise power of GPS SPS L1 C/A code is approximately
-130 dBW. That shows the received GPS signal is 30 dB below the thermal noise.
The minimum received GPS signal power levels corresponding to different elevation
angles are also illustrated as in the Figure 6 [12].
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Figure 6: Minimum Received GPS Signal Power Levels at Antenna [12].
2.3.2

Carrier-to-noise Ratio

Carrier-to-Noise-Density Ratio (C/N0 ) is simply the ratio of signal power to noise
power in a 1 Hz bandwidth, as shown in Equation (5). Carrier-to-noise ratio, then,
has units of ratio-Hz in dB-Hz [12].

CN R =

SignalP ower
∗ Bandwidth
N oiseP ower

(5)

This method reflects a direct relationship between carrier-to-noise and signal-tonoise ratios. It requires a good estimate of absolute noise power. Initially, it estimates
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the signal-to-noise ratio and then convert the result to carrier-to-noise-density ratio.
Yet, this approach is only good when the value of bandwidth is known.
Without the information of bandwidth given, Carrier-to-Noise-Density Ratio is
calculated from the lock detector as shown in Equation (6). Computing the power in
two bandwidths to estimate the carrier-to-noise-density ratio, this method works well
for 1 Hz update or noise at higher rates with M = 20 and K = 5 [12]. This is the
method that is used for this research. Other methods first estimate S/N and convert
to C/N0 and require a good estimate of absolute power.

C/N0n = 10log
2.3.3

µN P,n − 1
Thw (M − µN P,n )


[dB − Hz]

(6)

Receiver High-level Description

Satnav receivers’ input are the signals coming from the antenna as an input. The
satnav receiver’s function is to determine information such as pseudorange, carrier
phase, C/N0 , etc. to be used to provide a Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT)
solution. The satnav receiver’s primary function is to compute range measurements
to visible satellites. The secondary function is to extract the navigation message
and Position, Velocity, and Timing (PVT) solution. These are the pseudorange and
carrier phase measurements with corrections for errors. The receiver can be broken
up into sections as seen in Figure 7. These sections are the radio frequency (RF)
Front-End, Baseband Processor, and the System Processor.
The signal comes in from the antenna and transmits to the RF Front-End. The
Front-End essentially does three primary functions. The frequency first gets translated. This frequency translation means the signal is transferred from being a passband signal or RF signal to a baseband signal or Intermediate Frequency (IF) signal.
Next the bandwidths are selected. These bandwidths are related to the incoming
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signal’s bandwidth allocations. This bandwidth selection would be determined based
on the requirements of the receiver. An example is if the focus is on GNSS L1 signals
for less power consumption or on both GNSS L1 and L2 signals for a more accurate
PNT solution. Lastly for the Front-End is digitization. All modern satnav receivers
operate on digital samples which is required for this research. This determines the
data rate of the sampled signal and the depth of the samples which directly relates
to power consumption and processing power requirements.
The next block is the baseband processor which has two distinct subblocks. These
are the sample processor and the reduced-data processor. The sample processor is
a hardware accelerated processor, that takes the incoming samples and performs
preprocessing. This preprocessing takes the incoming digitized signal and performs
operations until the signal is at a 1 KHz rate. This allows a microprocessor to timely
be able to process the incoming data. It also allows the reduced-data processor to perform some software functions such as tracking loops, acquisition management, error
corrections and data decoding, interference detection/mitigation, and state machines.
The final block is the system processor. The system processor communicates with
the reduced-data processor in the baseband processor block. The output from the
reduced-data processor is raw data such as Time of Transmittion (TOT), estimate
for C/N0 , etc. The system processor takes the raw data and performs high-level
processes. It stores almanac information, send commands and state updates to the
reduced-data processor. The system processor also stores satnav information for each
PRN that is used to acquire and track the satnav signal. Finally, the information the
system processor stores is used to provide the PVT solutions.

17

Figure 7: Generic GNSS Receiver Block Diagram [12].
2.3.4

Overview of Correlation

As stated in the previous section of minimum signal-to-noise ratio, the received
GPS signal is usually 30 dB below the noise floor, which then raises a question on the
possibility of how the GPS receiver can receive the GPS signal. Since the received
GPS signal is too weak to be detected by a strong signal detection technique, the
GPS receiver is then interested in obtaining the received GPS signal parameters.
Therefore, correlation with local replicas of the received signal is the main method to
estimate those received signal parameters and verify the presence of the received GPS
signal. The known received signal parameters include carrier center frequency and
approximate Doppler frequency offset, PRN code and code chipping rate, and data
rate and message structure [12]. The correlator output of the in-phase and quadrature
phase is expressed as in Equation (11). The final term of ∆Φ̂m corresponds with the
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difference of the phase, in-phase or quadrature. R(τ ) is the correlator function of lag
τ , and Tpdi refers to the correlation time or pre-detection integration time.

sig
Ii,τ̂
,∆fˆ,Φ̂,m

AQ,m
sin(π(∆0 fˆm )Tpdi )
√
=
∗ cos(∆Φ̂m )
∗ N ∗ Di,m R(τ̂ ) ∗
2
(π(∆0 fˆm )Tpdi )

AQ,m
sin(π(∆0 fˆm )Tpdi )
√
∗ sin(∆Φ̂m )
Qsig
=
∗
N
∗
D
R(τ̂
)
∗
i,m
i,τ̂ ,∆fˆ,Φ̂,m
2
(π(∆0 fˆm )Tpdi )
(7)
where:
R(τ ) =

N
1 X
Gk Gk−τ
N k=1

is the correlation function for lag τ

∆0 fˆm = ∆fi,m − ∆fˆm

is the frequncy estimation error residual

∆Φ̂m = ∆Φi,m − Φ̂m

is the phase estimation error residual

The first situation of correlation occurs when the local replica is in-phase with
the incoming signal, which means same frequency and same phase. Demonstrated
with a two-dimensional diagram, this in-phase alignment results in large positive
correlation. Figure 8 below demonstrates the incoming signal, local carrier replica
and the resulting phaser of in-phase correlation.
The second illustration is when the local replica is same frequency and 180° outof-phase with the incoming signal. The alignment of incoming signal is inverted;
therefore, the correlation of the incoming signal and local replica is large negative.
Figure 9 illustrates the incoming signal with 180° out-of-phase local replica and their
correlation resulting phaser [12].
Another situation to concern is the correlation when the local replica is in quadrature phase, 90° out-of-phase, with the incoming signal. For this quadrature situation,
the alignment results in zero correlation. It proves that if correlating with only one
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Figure 8: Simple Correlation, in-phase [12].

Figure 9: Correlation of 180° out-of-phase Local Replica [12].
reference phase, only magnitude information is represented and there is no out-ofphase correlation. This situation is illustrated as in Figure 10 [12].
In order to resolve phase, a second replica which is 90° out-of-phase with the first
replica for the same signal is introduced. As the correlation of the out-of-phase replica
is orthogonal with the in-phase replica correlation, the achieved output is the highest.
This correlation is represented as in Figure 11 [12].
In addition, the single 90° out-of-phase local replica correlation and the second
90° out-of-phase local replica can be respectively represented as single and complex
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Figure 10: Correlation of a Single 90° out-of-phase Local Replica [12].

Figure 11: Correlation of Second 90° out-of-phase Local Replica [12].
correlator diagrams shown in Figure 12 [12].
In general, if there are two local replicas in quadrature phase, the phase of the
incoming signal can be arbitrary leading to different resulting phasers. Figure 13
shows the correlation of arbitrary phase of the incoming signal with two 90° out-ofphase local replicas [12].
From that, both magnitude and phase of the phase correlator can be calculated
as:
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Figure 12: Correlator Diagrams [12].

Figure 13: Arbitrary Phase of Incoming Signal [12].

Magnitude: Rˆm =

p

2 + Q2
Im
m

(8)
Phase:

Φˆm = tan−1 (Qm /Im )

With the incoming noise, the correlation achieved with zero-mean has small inphase (I) and out-of-phase (Q) magnitudes. As the correlation time increases, the
correlation value decreases. Figure 14 demonstrates how the incoming signal with
incoming noise correlates with out-of-phase local carrier replicas [12].
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Figure 14: Correlation of Incoming Noise [12].
Overall, the correlation envelope or the magnitude of correlation vector is resulted
from the power of the in-phase and quadrature magnitudes. Figure 15 summarizes
different scenarios of local replica with incoming signal code [12].

2.3.5

Carrier Tracking Loop

Carrier tracking using tracking loops to estimate the frequency, phase, and alignment of local replica correlated with the received GPS signal. Tracking loops are
characterized by pre-detection integration time, phase or frequency discriminators including pure phase locked loop (PLL), Costas PLL and frequency locked loop (FLL),
loop filter including loop’s order and noise bandwidth, and external aiding [13].
There are two main GNSS receiver carrier tracking loops – FLL and PLL. Frequency locked loop expects to drive the incoming-minus-replica frequency residual
to zero. Using the FLL method, phase wanders freely as this method only focuses
on locking the frequency of the received signal. FLL does not provide clear range
measurements with decimeter-level noise. Frequency discriminators are then used to
calculate residual frequency errors between incoming and local replicas. On the other
hand, phase locked loop wants to drive the incoming-minus-replica phase residual to
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Figure 15: Correlation with Prompt, Early by ½ Chip, and Late by ½ Chip [12].
zero which results in the alignment of the incoming and replica phases. PLL compared
to FLL is more sensitive to dynamic stresses, and PLL provides unclear range measurements with millimeter-level noise. There are pure PLL and Costas PLL carrier
phase discriminators used to estimate residual phase angle of in-phase and quadrature
outputs with respect to channel. Pure PLL discriminator distributes better tracking
threshold of 6 dB compared to Costas one. The pure PLL discriminator is also sensitive to 180° phase changes of BPSK and used to track true data wipe off. In contrast,
Costas PLL discriminator is insensitive to 180° phase changes of BPSK. Hence, Costas
PLL is used to track carrier components with BPSK modulation [13].
A tracking loop filter is mainly used to reduce noise on phase and frequency
discriminators. Tracking loop filter’s performance is set by the noise bandwidth to
respond to signal dynamics depending on the loop order. Depending on loop orders,
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there are loop filters corresponding to changes in either phase or frequency. Performances of these loop filters are determined by the corresponding noise bandwidths.
More different values of noise bandwidth and practical loop filter designs can be found
in “Understanding GPS: Principles and Applications” by Kaplan and Hegarty [14]
[15].
For the loop filters of PLL, the first order PLL responds to phase changes. Since
the first order PLL cannot pull in a frequency offset, it is sensitive to velocity or
frequency stresses. In the first order PLL, a single integrator – the range and bias,
is used to hold the phase offset. The numerically-controlled oscillator (NCO) of the
first order PLL is the range and bias integrator. On the contrary, the loop filter in the
second order PLL responds to change in frequency. Second order PLL is sensitive to
acceleration stresses because it can pull in a frequency rate. There are two integrators
involved in the second order PLL. In which, velocity integrator responds to frequency
offset and NCO, the range and bias integrator, holds phase offset. Lastly, third order
PLL’s loop filter responds to frequency rate change. Since the third order PLL cannot
pull in the frequency rate change, it is sensitive to jerk stresses. As it is the third
order, there are three integrators functioning in the PLL. It includes acceleration
integrator responding to frequency rate, velocity integrator holding frequency offset,
and NCO (or the range and bias integrator) responding to phase offset. Figure 16
shows the diagrams of loop filters as in the first order, second order, and third order
PLL [14].
There are two orders of loop filters used in frequency locked loops. The first
order FLL’s loop filter responds to a frequency offset and cannot pull in a non-zero
frequency rate. Therefore, first order FLL is sensitive to acceleration stresses. If
the first order PLL’s loop filter only has one integrator, there are two integrators
used in the second order FLL: velocity integrator holding frequency offset, and NCO
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Figure 16: Loop Filters of PLL Varying with Loop Orders [14].
corresponding to phase offset. Next, responding to a rate change of frequency is the
second order FLL’s loop filter. It is sensitive to jerk stresses because it is incapable
of pulling in a rate change of frequency rate. Integrators included in the second
order FLL are acceleration integrator responsible for holding frequency rate, velocity
integrator responding to frequency offset, and NCO holding phase offset. Below are
the diagrams of loop filters in the first order and second order FLL shown in Figure 17
[14].
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Figure 17: Loop Filters of FLL Varying with Loop Orders [14].
2.3.6

Code Tracking Loop

Code error discriminators and closed-loop corrections compose a delay locked loop
(DLL). A DLL driving the incoming-minus-replica code phase residual to zero uses the
same loop filter as a PLL due to code phase tracking. Compared to carrier tracking
loops of FLL and PLL, code tracking is more efficient. While GNSS receiver carrier
tracking loops produce ambiguous range measurements, respectively, with decimeter
and millimeter-level noise for FLL and PLL, the code tracking loop produces pseudorange measurements with meter-level noise [15].
Using as a discriminator, DLL discriminator responds to code phase error of local
code with respect to incoming code. There are 2 main types of DLL discriminators:
coherent and non-coherent. Combining energy from in-phase I and quadrature Q
channels, a non-coherent DLL discriminator does not need carrier phase tracking.
But the quadrature Q channel adds more noise when the phase is locked. On the
other hand, a coherent DLL discriminator requires carrier phase tracking and gets
sensitive to carrier cycle slips. Since the coherent DLL discriminator avoids squaring
loss from the quadrature Q channel, it provides better performance. In general, DLL
discriminators including coherent and non-coherent can be normalized to remove amplitude sensitivity, improve their performances during rapid signal fading conditions.
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However, they do not prevent signal-to-noise dependency on loop gain [15].
In relation to code tracking loop, there is carrier aiding of code loop which takes
out most code dynamics and only retains effects from multipath and the ionosphere.
The first-order DLL with carrier aiding is sufficient to lock the code phase. Thus, to
provide low-noise pseudo-range measurements responding to multipath effects, code
loop iteration rate is reduced to 1 second and the noise bandwidth also gets reduced
to 1 Hertz [15].

2.3.7

Lock Detectors

Lock detectors are necessary to determine whether the GPS signal is being tracked.
There are 3 ways to implement lock detectors including code lock, frequency lock, and
phase lock detectors. Code lock detectors can be alternated by frequency lock and
phase lock detectors [16].

2.3.7.1

Frequency Lock Detectors

As automatic frequency control (AFC) loop and FLL are used in transition for
fixed periods of time, a frequency lock detector is not needed in a receiver tracking
carrier phase. Frequency lock detectors are not responsive because the transitions
constrain pre-detection bandwidths. Instead, a code lock detector is used for transitioning, and therefore, the carrier lock becomes phase lock after transitioning to the
PLL. Additionally, as miniaturized airborne GPS receiver miniaturized airborne GPS
receiver (MAGR) does not use PLL, a 25 Hz offset false lock is detected either with
a failing parity or by a discrepancy between carrier and Doppler code [16].
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2.3.7.2

Phase Lock Detectors

Essentially, phase lock can be detected by the normalized estimate of the cosine
of twice the carrier phase as shown in eq. (9) where [16]:

C2Φk =

N DBk
N BPk

where:
N BD = Narrowband Difference
N BP = Narrowband Power
!2
!2
M
M
X
X
N BDk =
Ii −
Qi
i=1

N BPk =

M
X

(9)

i=1

!2
Ii

i=1

+

M
X

!2
Qi

i=1

Parity can be considered as a general phase lock detector for large phase tracking
errors or cycle slips. The large phase errors will then cause bit sign detection errors
which eventually leads to a continuously failing parity. Therefore, false lock is also
detected [16].

2.4

Signal Authentication Schemes
This section provides different methods to GNSS signal authentication that are

either being implemented or are in the process of being implemented. Each section
will also provide some high level pros and cons of the method being described.

2.4.1

Navigation Message Authentication

Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) is one of the most important techniques implemented to strengthen GNSS signals against spoofing. In other words,
NMA is an application of the message authentication concept operated by satellites.
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It requires an authentication signature be encrypted in the original message. Then,
the message and authentication signature are transmitted to a receiver which has
its own key to access and verify the transmission. To generate an authentication
signature, there are two ways which are either using symmetric or asymmetric key
techniques. Both symmetric and asymmetric methods have been applied for GPS
and Galileo signals. If using a symmetric key technique, the transmitter and receiver
will share a secret key. However, this method requires improving security layers to
prevent unauthorized users gaining access to the key. On the other hand, an asymmetric key technique requires the secret key to function differently in the transmitter
and the receiver. That means the secret key is used to generate the authentication
message in the transmitter while it is responsible to verify the message received in
the receiver. To ensure that the verification key comes from an authorized source,
a public key infrastructure (PKI) is usually used. Other than that, the asymmetric
method also requires more intensive encryption and longer keys for the same security
level when compared with the symmetric technique [17].

2.4.1.1

Pros and Cons

The pros of providing confidence in the satnav signal through NMA is that it is
operational today and in multiple GNSS constellations. As with all message authentication methods, NMA is a multiple stage system that was developed over many
years before becoming operational. Since NMA is already operational this is a large
pro for the system. NMA is not a solution to spoofing, but it does provide a method
to identify some forms of spoofed signals. NMA is also part of a multiple system
approach that makes it more difficult for an adversary to spoof a satnav signal. The
way NMA was developed provides that it will be an integral part of signal authentication in the future. The cons of a system like this could be considered longer. As
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mentioned as a pro, NMA does not address the spoofer issue, but rather provides
a form of mitigation. As a con, NMA does not solve the spoofing issue. Additionally, NMA requires key management that adds more cost to the system the longer
it is used. Due to the importance of these keys, receivers with NMA keys are very
expensive due to the data secrecy to protect the navigation method and are only
available to military users. Therefore, NMA provides little authentication value to
a civilian user though the navigation message. Finally, to add an improvement to a
NMA system takes years to become operational since the improved signal requires a
minimum constellation of 18 satellites before it can be operational.

2.4.2

CHIMERA

Chips-Message Robust Authentication (CHIMERA) is a proposal to strengthen
security systems of GPS civilian signals against spoofing attacks. CHIMERA is going
to authenticate the navigation data and spreading code encryption in the legacy GPS
L1C and L5. In another words, CHIMERA is a hybrid authentication technique using
NMA and spreading codes. Applying the time-binding concept, CHIMERA uses the
key from the navigation authentication message to generate cryptographic markers
which puncture the spreading code. In relation to the authentication markers, the
distribution of the key is a concern. There are two methods to distribute the key.
One is called the slow channel method because the distribution rate of the key is slow,
which results from slower data rates and existing subscriptions to the navigation data
bandwidth. Meanwhile, the fast channel method is when the key distribution rate is
expected to be higher due to the increase in higher data rates of external data sources
[3].
Both fast and slow channels contain CHIMERA epoch. CHIMERA epoch is defined as a carrier of the complete transmission of a set of a digital signature and
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markers. The CHIMERA epoch in the fast channel is independent from the one in
the slow channel. The CHIMERA epoch of the slow channel represents a set of data
frames including the digital signature, the authenticated data, and the authentication
markers. For the fast channel, the CHIMERA epoch is a period of time corresponding
to a fixed marker key. Depending on different signal structures and protocols, the
duration of the CHIMERA epoch is varied. Although CHIMERA is practical against
spoofing, there are limitations needed to study further, such as repeater attacks [3].
In addition, CHIMERA has also been studied to determine the authenticated
location and GNSS time which is known as proof of location. This study is necessary
as nowadays it is easier for an unauthorized party to use a simple phone application
to disturb the location, for example. Consequently, more intellectual property will be
easily stolen which leads to serious military and economic consequences. Two studies
conducted on proof of location are pretty good proof of location but a not so good
navigation system, and pretty good proof of location and a good navigation system.
Specifically, the pretty good proof of location but a not so good navigation system
is useful in proving one’s recent position but not reliable to establish a real-time
navigation system. A receiver or spoofer will be struggling to falsify a location in
the presence of encrypted signal. When the encrypted signal’s spreading codes are
released, it is difficult to read them directly because they are below the thermal noise
floor. The pretty good proof of location approach can be modified by adapting the
second generation modernized GNSS signals to improve and become a good navigation
system. That is referred to the second study – pretty good proof of location and a
good navigation system. The second generation GNSS signals include a pilot channel
and a data channel. The pilot channel allows signals to operate at lower signal-tonoise ratios, and the data channel spreads codes in a lower data rate to transfer
satellite orbital data and other information. Not only that, the data channel in those
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second generation GNSS signals can use cryptographic data signing and watermarked
signals to improve proof of location. Signal watermarking is especially important and
useful when under cyber-attack [18], [19].

2.4.2.1

Pros and Cons

The pros of providing confidence in the satnav signal through CHIMERA are
similar to NMA once it becomes operational. CHIMERA, like NMA, is not a solution
to spoofing but it does provide a method to identify some forms of spoofed signals.
CHIMERA is also part of a multiple system approach that makes it more difficult for
an adversary to spoof a satnav signal. CHIMERA is also available for civilian use.
This is a large pro for the civilian users and for applications for military users where
the use of NMA is not operationally feasible. The cons of providing CHIMERA start
from not being available today. This was a large inspiration to the DAS research so
that civilian authentication could be available in a shorter timeframe. Like updating
NMA, CHIMERA will takes years to become operation since the improved signal
requires a minimum constellation of 18 satellites. Another issue with chimera is that
it is not designed against repeaters. Though there are methods to mitigate repeaters,
they require high end parts.

2.5

Signal Authentication via Presence-Detection of Encrypted Component(s)
DAS is a system that offers a civilian solution to GNSS signal authentication

by providing confidence in a receiver’s PNT solution. DAS is accomplished with
a system of receivers that can estimate the encrypted chips, timestamp and store
the information, and communicate with each other. This system breaks down into
two types of receivers and are named based on the receiver’s role. The reference
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station generates an increased gain estimated encrypted bit to estimate the encrypted
chips with a low chip error rate (CER). The participating user(s) (PU) estimates the
encrypted chips with the normal CER of a typical GNSS receiver. This section will
introduce the fundamental concepts behind DAS as well as explaining some initial
assumptions for the system.

2.5.1

System Overview

Since the goal of this research is to demonstrate a proof-of-concept authentication
system that uses already operational signals and readily available technology, it is
important to cover the fundamental concepts. These will be covered at a high level
and will be broken down in more detail in the following sections of this research.
DAS is a system concept. It does not work with just one part of the system but
requires at a minimum two parts of the system. For this research, these two minimum
parts are referred to as the reference station (RS) and the PU. Based on the needs
of the application, multiple reference stations and PU systems can be used and some
examples will be discussed later in this section. DAS does require a satnav signal but
does not require any modifications to the signals already in operation.
These receivers both on a hardware level function as a typical receiver with additional processing. One of these additional processes is to estimate the encrypted
chips. This is accomplishable because the encrypted signals have chipping rates that
are related by integer values and are synchronous and transmitted orthogonally to
the civilian / open-source signals.

2.5.2

DAS Use Case Examples

DAS can further be broken down by looking at just the RS and PU portions as
seen in the block diagram in Figure 19. Figure 19 shows a simplified receiver block
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Figure 18: High level Block Diagram of DAS. Starting with the reference station,
the incoming signal is received through a high gain antenna and after aligning the
open-source signal with the encrypted signal, the encrypted signal is estimated. The
encrypted signal is timestamped and stored and send out to the RAV. Much like
the RS, the PU’s incoming signal is received as a typical GNSS receiver and after
aligning the open-source signal with the encrypted signal, the encrypted signal is
estimated. The encrypted signal for the EAV is timestamped and stored and once
the encrypted signal from the RS is received, the correlation between the RAV and
EAV can be achieved. This will produce a correlation value that will be tested against
a predetermined threshold. If the correlation value is above the threshold than the
signal is deemed authentic and if below the threshold the signal would be deemed
non-authentic.
diagram with the added blocks required for DAS to estimate the encrypted chips.
DAS can benefit many different civilian applications. Figure 20 shows a small
portion of the civilian applications that can benefit from DAS. As mentioned in
Chapter I, GNSS signals and are responsible for $70 Billion to the US economy
annually. The ability to disrupt the GNSS signal is very easy [20]. In a feasability
test, single and multifrequency GNSS signal spoofing was achieved using a COTS such
as a Rasberry-Pi. It is these type of spoofing attacks that DAS is initially focused
against. There are also GNSS simulation spoofing for applications such as Pokémon
GO. These type of simulated spoofers would require DAS to be implementd on the
user’s device [21]. DAS being implemented in high priority areas can reduce economic
losses and mishaps that are due to terrorists/hackers. DAS can allow receivers to
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Figure 19: DAS Simplified Receiver Block Diagram. This Figure shows a simplified
typical receiver with additional blocks for DAS that would need to be implemented
for the RS/PU. These additional blocks are noted by the highlighted text.
maintain an accurate PVT solution with some examples shown in Figure 20.
DAS can also benefit different military applications that require keying, key management, and securing the technology against tampering are outside of the mission
requirements. Military receivers are expensive and not likely to be used in applications where the receiver is disposable, or recovery is not feasible. This opens a
useful scenario for DAS in military application. It can be used to reduce the cost of
a mission based on interference of GNSS spoofed signals.
For military applications, the RS can be designed to be more mobile to support
the operational mission. This can be a transportable RS as well as a mobile RS
as seen in Figure 21 below. The aircraft in most military cases would be a low-cost
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or high projectile device while the ground PU devices
could be manned units that could be left behind. There are endless applications to
implement DAS for both military and civilian applications.
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Figure 20: Possible Civilian Uses of DAS. This figure shows how DAS is able to
be used for civilian uses. This figure shows that DAS can benefit FAA commercial
airliners, stock market trading, the electric grid, etc. The local reference stations are
expected to be able to determine a non-authentic signal based on previous research
that has been accomplished in those departments.
2.5.3

RAV/EAV Assumptions

This section will focus on the assumptions used in developing the system and
explaining the reasoning behind each assumption. These assumptions were made
based on best practices currently used in receiver theory and application as well as
general assumptions made based on research and discussion with expects in the field.
Additionally, these assumptions were made with no design requirements such as power
or size but were based on technology available at the time of this research.
The first assumption is that the receivers will behave with the same assumptions
used for receiver’s theory and design. These assumptions are, but are not limited to:
The C/N0 must be reasonable as described in the link budget. The receiver must
be able to lock onto the signal accounting for the normal GNSS signal errors (iono-
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Figure 21: Possible Military Uses of DAS. This figure shows that DAS can benefit
multiple military applications. For military applications, the reference stations can
be designed to be more mobile to support the operational mission. This can be a
transportable reference station as well as a mobile reference station as seen in the
examples above.
sphere, troposphere, receiver noise, multipath, ephemeris, etc.). The receiver has the
required sampling rate to detect the individual encrypted chips. These individual
encrypted chips will be discussed in more detail in the Reference Authentication Vector (RAV)/Estimated Authentication Vector (EAV) generation section. The receiver
has enough individual loops with a minimum of two for each tracking channel. In
this case each SV that is being tracked is one channel and each signal (C/A-code,
L1 P-code, etc.) is the individual tracking loop. The final assumption is that the
incoming signal from the satellite is functioning properly [22], [23].
The next assumption is that the encrypted component cannot be spoofed, but
that it can be repeated as in a repeater attack. This is not to be confused with the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulated GNSS repeaters for indoor
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use [24]. A repeater attack would infer that a nearby system would take the incoming
signal and with some delayed time output that same signal in an effort to broadcast
an appearing ‘authentic’ encrypted signal. It is also assumed that the receiver has a
very good time reference to detect the time offset that would be present for a repeater
signal [25]. This implies that the receiver is designed with quality components that
are able to perform to the needs of the system.
For this research, the receivers are also assumed to be stationary. The receivers
moving should not affect the outcome of the results from this research, but no tests
are expected to be performed to test this case.

2.5.4

DAS Pros and Cons

This section will cover some of the pros and the cons of the system design of
DAS. These pros and cons are based on other system designs that are currently in
development such as CHIMERA as mentioned before or GALILEO Public Regulated
Service (PRS) as well as the GNSS encrypted signals such as GPS P(Y) Code or
GLONASS P-Code. In this case it is compared to having valid cryptographic keys to
get the data from the encrypted signals [26].

2.5.4.1

Cons of DAS

First is to introduce the cons of the system design for DAS. The main thing to note
is that it requires a system of receivers that must be able to communicate. The RS
needs to have clear communication with the PU. This means there is an additional
complication in the system as well as another way to try to interrupt the system.
There can be many different counter measures though to combat interruptions to
this design. This also means that the system would have to be set up like cellular
network towers, to some degree, to possibly meet regional operation [20]. This is
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based on the side channel network which is out of the scope of this research.
Another con is that the system is not designed to combat GNSS repeater attackers,
though if built properly, the repeaters could be for the most part, overcome based
on previous research [25]. Finally, the current system design would need more power
to be implemented than the typical GNSS receiver. This is because an additional or
larger processer is required as well as more memory to store and transmit or store,
receive, and correlate the data between the RS and the PU (RAV correlating with
EAV).

2.5.4.2

Pros of DAS

Though there are a number cons for the system, there are also many pros to the
design of DAS. First and most importantly, DAS could be implemented today. This is
because it uses current GNSS signals with receiver technology that is available today.
New technology in space typically takes a minimum of 5 years if resources are not
an option. This also depends on the design life of the system. In most cases with
GNSS, the design life exceeds expectation and therefore new technology takes longer
to be fully operational. This is also due to the need for a minimum of 18 to 24 GNSS
satellites.
Another pro is that DAS over time can be implemented with other civilian authentication systems. Once in place, if designed correctly, DAS could be upgraded to
also receive new signals for authentication providing even higher levels of confidence
that the signal is authentic. DAS is also designed to mitigate spoofers. These are
signal sources that can send out simple or complex satnav data that is false to severely
reduce the PNT accuracy of GNSS. DAS accomplishes this by providing confidence
in the authenticity of the received signal. If the signal is perceived as authentic then
DAS will continue to receive the data from that source as a typical receiver; if the
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signal is non-authentic, then DAS would ignore all information from that source and
continue to operate normally providing a PNT solution.
DAS is also adaptable. The system is designed to be adaptable by being able to
work with multiple GNSSs as well as how it can be used in the field. DAS is designed
to work with any satnav signal that has an open service signal and an encrypted signal
that are synchronously in orthogonal phases. Cellular chip manufacturers as well as
GNSS receiver manufacturers have been increasing the number of GNSSs supported
on their chips throughout the years. For example, the latest Qualcomm Snapdragon
888 which is a popular flagship processor has the following satnav support: Beidou,
Galileo, GLONASS, Dual frequency GNSS, NavIC, NavIC enabled, GPS, GNSS,
QZSS, SBAS [27]. Multi-frequency and multi-GNSS support in GNSS receivers is
already available and DAS can be implemented to work with the satnav signals that
are transmitted as discussed later in more detail in Section 2.6 of this thesis.
It is also adaptable because DAS can be implemented as a regional or permanent
system or as a constant moving or temporary system. RSs and PUs can be designed
based on system requirements. This means the system can perform even better in
certain cases where it exceeds the minimum requirements used in Chapter III of
this thesis. Additionally, it can be used for a large array of civilian and military
applications due to the adaptability of the receiver designs.
Finally, DAS is designed to be cost effective for the user. To create a 24 satellite
satnav system to encompass the world with a very low estimate of $200-$300 million at
best for the each satellite to include an additional low estimate of $50 million launch
cost for each satellite, to complete a new technology would cost at a minimum $6
billion to $8.4 billion. These numbers are typically less than what is the normal price
though this depends on the individual GNSS requirements and design life. These
numbers were derived from the author’s experience at Los Angeles Air Force Base
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(LAAFB) working on the GPS IIIF program. There has been no additional cost
engineering research for this thesis, it is expected to cost much less than the 24
satellite system for certain applications.

2.6

RAV Generation
The RS is considerably one of the most important parts of the system. The RS,

by design, has a lower CER than a typical receiver or than the PUs. This helps the
PU determine authenticity of a signal through correlation of the RAV with the EAV.
This section will cover the different approaches reference stations can use to increase
SNR to reduce the CER. This section will also explain the pros and cons of each
method to increase SNR as well as the method used for this research.

2.6.1

SNR on Earth with Typical GNSS Antenna

Based on the link budget explained in Section 2.3.1, the GNSS signal power is
-160 dB for a typical receiver. The noise floor fluctuates between -130 dB and -133
dB. Figure 22 demonstrates the GPS L1 legacy signals from a typical GNSS receiver.
This figure simulates a GNSS signal that is relatively 30 dB below the noise floor.
An antenna provides gain to the incoming signal power to increase the SNR. The
techniques to increase SNR will be explained in more detail in Section 2.6.3. Figure 23
shows a demonstration of the GPS L1 legacy signals from a typical GNSS receiver
compared to a high gain antenna receiver. This figure shows that the entire signal
within the band for the high gain antenna receiver increases.

2.6.2

SNR vs. CER

An important aspect of this research is the CER which is discussed in more detail
in Section 3.4.2. In order to determine the required SNR for the reference receiver,
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Figure 22: Simulation of GPS L1 legacy signals from a typical GNSS receiver. This
figure shows simulated signals that are relatively 30 dB below the noise floor.
the research first needed to understand the relationship between SNR and CER. A
simulation was used where the signal is a series of 1 and -1 and each sample represents
a chip. The noise was set to Gaussian with µ=0 and σ based on SNR. Figure 24 shows
probability density functions (PDFs) for the number of errors in a system for one
million Monte Carlo simulations for different SNR values. The normalized number of
errors shifted to the right the lower the SNR value. Figure 25 shows the results as
the CER for different SNR values. The figure shows that as SNR increases the CER
decreases. It also shows that there is a range which could be considered the ‘sweet
spot’ for CER and SNR. Initially, the CER increase is minimal, but between -10 dB
and 5 dB SNR, the change becomes more drastic before it hits a CER of 0.

2.6.3

Methods to increase SNR

There are multiple methods to increase the SNR for GNSS signals. The next few
sections will cover some of the more common methods to increase SNR for GNSS
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Figure 23: Simulation of GPS L1 legacy signals from a typical GNSS receiver and
high gain antenna receiver. This figure shows simulated signals that are relatively 30
dB below the noise floor.
signals but are not the only methods available. The methods discussed will be using
the typical parabolic antenna. These are some the most common antennas used today
in multiple applications. Another method is to use a phased array system. Phased
array systems are computer-controlled systems that use multiple antenna elements to
increase the SNR. There are multiple approaches for phased array antennas and this
research will discuss two common uses of phased array systems for GNSS.

2.6.3.1

Parabolic Antenna

A parabolic antenna is an antenna that uses a curved surface with the crosssectional shape of a parabola. The most common form is shaped like a dish and
is popularly called a dish antenna. Parabolic antennas provide a high gain due to
their high directivity. This means that parabolic antennas typically have a narrow
beamwidth, thus requiring to be pointed at the signal source. This is also the main
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Figure 24: PDF for Number of Error in Sequence. Number of errors in the sequence
when normalized for sequence size of erros is the CER ratio.
reason why parabolic antennas on average have the highest gains.
Parabolic antennas can increase the gain they can achieve by increasing the diameter of the dish. This in turn narrows the beamwidth. Parabolic antennas must be
larger than the wavelength of the radio waves used and therefore are typically used
for high frequency radio waves. Parabolic antennas are designed with a parabolic
reflector and a feed antenna. The reflector focuses the signal to the feed antenna resulting in a signal power gain [23]. This research focused on using parabolic antennas
due to the overall low cost and availability. More information on parabolic antennas
is explained in Section 3.4.

2.6.3.2

Phased Array Antenna

In antenna theory, a phased array is a computer-controlled array of antennas which
creates a beam of radio waves that can be electronically steered to point in different
directions. This can be achieved for both transmitting and receiving antenna systems.
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Figure 25: CER for Different SNR Values.
This section covers phased arrays with a large number of small elements and a small
number of large elements, or more specifically, parabolic antennas. Phased array is
a design concept that could also provide the required SNR gain and is referred to
multiple times throughout this research as a viable option.
In general, gain from a phased array antenna is a function of the individual element
gain and the number of elements. This aperture gain can be determined by [19]:

GA = 4π

Aη
λ2

Where:
(10)
A = aperature area
η = aperature efficiency
λ = wavelength
For a phased array, the gain of the individual elements is a function of what

46

radiator is used.

Large Number of Elements Phased array antennas are much newer in
design than parabolic antennas. Phased array antennas also can be designed multiple ways with different purposes. There are four prominent designs. These designs
are passive electronically scanned array (PESA), active electronically scanned array
(AESA), hybrid beam forming phased array, and digital beam forming (DBF) array.
In all cases, the arrays can either be used with a transmitter or receiver. PESAs can
radiate several beams of radio waves at multiple frequencies in different directions
simultaneously. PESAs typically use large amplifiers and phase shifters that consist
of elements controlled by magnetic fields or voltage gradients. The phase shifters
introduce interference between the signals so that there is constructive interference in
the desired direction and deconstructive interference in all other directions. AESAs
are antennas in which the beam of radio waves can be electronically steered to point
in different directions and all the antenna elements are connected to a single transmitter. AESA radar befits from longer range, the ability to detect smaller targets,
and better resistance to radar jamming. These active array systems are more advanced and are referred to as second-generation phased-array technology [28]. DBF
phased arrays have a digital receiver/transmitter at each element in the array. Each
element is digitized by the receiver/transmitter for a given signal. Therefore, the
antenna beams can be digitally formed in a field programmable gate array (FPGA),
application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) or another method to achieve the array computer. This allows for multiple antenna beams to be formed simultaneously.
A hybrid beam forming phased array is a combination of an AESA and a digital
beam forming phased array. It uses subarrays that are active phased arrays that are
combined together to form the full array. Each subarray could then be considered an
element in the DBF phased array and has its own digital receiver/exciter. The hybrid
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beam forming phased array allows for clusters of beams to be created simultaneously
[29].
Small Number of Parabolic Antennas An initial low-cost approach for
this research was to design and implement a phased array parabolic antenna. This
was to minimize the need for mechanical parts while at the same time gaining the
benefits of having multiple antenna elements. An example of a simplified design can
be seen in Figure 26 below.

Figure 26: Simplified Rendition of Phased Array Parabolic Antennas.
Once the research was beginning, this concept was proven to be inefficient. As
an example of a use case, M-code’s received signal power is -150 dBW. Assuming the
subcarrier wipeoff, the noise will be over a BPSK-5 null-null bandwidth of 10.23MHz.
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Noise power is -133 dBW and therefore the SNR is -25 dB. On average a 1-meter
parabolic antenna has a gain of 21 dB and a beamwidth of 14 degrees. If 2.5 dB
beamforming gain is assumed for every doubling of elements, 4 elements would provide 5 dB of gain providing 26 dB gain from the parabolic array. On average a
2-meter parabolic antenna has a gain of 26 dB and a beamwidth of 7 degrees. This
provides that the parabolic antenna array gain is equivalent to the same sized diameter parabolic antenna. The only benefit would be that the shape could change to
meet design requirements. This shows that a parabolic array is not practical. To
avoid using mechanical parts, the antenna array would have to be so massive that
the cost and computational burden would exceed the benefits over the mechanically
pointed antenna systems.

2.7

GNSS Spoofing
GNSS PNT has significant impact on everyday life for both civilian and military

applications and therefore becoming a major target for illicit exploitation by terrorist, hackers, and other countries militaries. This section will cover GNSS spoofing
techniques and GNSS vulnerabilities against spoofing attacks.

2.7.1

GNSS Spoofing Techniques

Spoofing generation can be divided into three main categories: GNSS signal simulators, receiver-based spoofers, and sophisticated receiver-based spoofers [21].
A GNSS signal simulator is a method to spoof the authentic satnav signal by
mimicking GNSS signals. This type of spoofer is not necessarily synchronized with
the real satnav signals and therefore looks like noise for a receiver operating in the
tracking mode. This allows the spoofer to mislead commercial GNSS receivers. The
GNSS signal simulator is considered the simplest type of spoofer and generally can
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be detected by different anti-spoofing techniques [21].
A receiver-based spoofer is a more advanced type of spoofer and consists of concatenating a GNSS receiver with a spoofed transmitter. This type of spoofer first
synchronizes with an official GNSS signal extracting the required information for a
PNT solution and then generates a spoofed signal knowing the 3D pointing vector of
its transmit antenna toward the target receiver. The idea behind this type of spoofer
is to keep the transmit power just above the correct signal to successfully mislead the
receiver [30].
The final major spoofing technique is the sophisticated receiver-based spoofer and
is considered the most complex method of spoofing. The sophisticated receiver-based
spoofer can assume the centimeter level position of the target receiver allowing for
perfect synchronization of the spoofed signal’s code and carrier phase to the authentic
signal. There are limitations regarding this spoofer type. It is only achievable for a
small region and antenna placements are limited when involving a moving target
receiver [31].

2.7.2

GNSS Vulnerabilities Against Spoofing

Like GNSS spoofing techniques, GNSS vulnerabilities can be grouped into three
major categories at the receiver level: signal processing, data bit, and PNT solution
levels.
For the GNSS signal processing, the signal structure, PRN, modulation type,
bandwidth, frequency, Doppler, and signal strength for civilian signals are known.
Additionally, most commercial GNSS receivers are equipped with an automatic gain
control (AGC) block that compensates the power variations in the GNSS signal.
AGC can increase vulnerability of receivers against a high power spoofing signal
since it automatically adjusts the input signal gain according to spoofed signals [32].
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Therefore, knowing the signal structure and operational basics of the civilian receivers,
a spoofed signal can be generated to counterfeit an authentic signal to mislead the
receivers.
Additionally, the framing structure of GNSS civilian signals is publicly known.
This framing structure consists of the almanac, telemetry information, and satellite
ephemeris. Since this information does not change rapidly over short intervals, the
spoofer can take advantage of this ‘stability’ to generate the GNSS data frame [21].
Additionally, the health of the satellite can be manipulated to mislead the spoofer
[33].
For PNT solution counterfeiting, the spoofer can inject pseudorange measurements
to the receiver allowing for incorrect PVT. This PVT error is proportional to the range
residuals modified by a factor of geometry. In some applications, GNSS receivers are
strictly for timing synchronization such as cellular towers. This allows for spoofing
attacks to highly disrupt the accuracy of estimating timing [34].

2.8

Encrypted Signal Processing and Tracking
Normally, GNSS signals are digitally acquired and tracked by exploiting the known

signal structure as described in Section 2.2. For the encrypted signals, part of the
signal structure is classified and therefore they are used by military receivers. Acquisition of the known signal structures can be used to estimate signal parameters that
initialize tracking loops. The tracking loops then estimate code and carrier errors
and use loop filters to apply corrections to the alignment of a local replica. At the
receiver, once the known open signal is aligned and the encrypted signal is aligned,
the individual encrypted chips can be estimated.
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2.8.1

Code Numerically-Controlled Oscillator (NCO)

The code Numerically-Controlled Oscillator (NCO) design is similar to that of
the carrier NCO. The carrier NCO is used to generate sine and cosine replicas whose
frequency can be modified to eliminate components from the IF carrier and strip away
the Doppler frequency. The code NCO is used to generate a signal that is utilized to
drive and align the replica to the C/A code and is able to finely adjust the frequency
of oscillation.
The prompt channel is used to strip the C/A code from the input signal so the
carrier frequency or phase can be tracked. The early and late channels are used to
form an error signal that speeds up or slows down the code NCO. The objective is
to keep the replica code perfectly aligned with the input signal. When aligned, the
NCO code phase allows the receiver to determine the pseudorange, which as discussed
previously, is used to solve for the user location. The raw pseudorange output is
derived from the code NCO when differenced against a free running NCO having no
error inputs. The tracking loop can be seen in Figure 27 showing a simplified block
diagram with the code NCO.
The tracking operation with the code NCO also allows the local clock to be transmitted intermittently rather than in a steady stream relative to the received signal
chip clock. What this means is the code NCO not only has to implement time skew,
it also must be able to slow down or speed up. The NCO does this by updating both
an integer chip attribute and a fractional attribute as seen in the block diagram in
Figure 28. The fractional value is updated based on the local clock with a chips/sample constant, plus once every 1 ms the loop filter output error signal is included. For
explanation purposes, when the fractional value falls outside [0,1] a value of 1.0 is
added or subtracted from the NCO integer attribute. This is best represented as the
stair step function seen in Figure 29.
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Figure 27: Simplified block diagram of the code and carrier tracking loops. The
input to the Integrate and Dump blocks are from the sampled signal from the frontend and the Replica Carrier/Code Generator. The Replica Carrier/Code Generators
are influenced by the output of the Code/Carrier NCO.
The stair-step represents the fractional code phase that is based on the chipping
rate of the signal and the sampling rate. A complete cycle of the NCO phase accumulator represents one complete chip of the PRN sequence. The steps size, overflow,
and remainder are determined by:


chipping rate
Step Size = round 2 ∗
sampling rate
N



Overf low = Step Size > 2N − 1
Remainder = Step Size − 2N ∗ f loor

(11)


Step Size
2N



Since the P(Y) signal is 10x the frequency of the C/A signal, there are 10 P(Y)
chips for every C/A chip. Using these signal properties, once the C/A code is perfectly
aligned, the P(Y) chips will also be aligned, and the sample boundaries corresponding
to individual P(Y) chips can be determined as seen in Figure 30.
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Figure 28: Block diagram of how the code generator is implemented using code NCO.
This is done to advance/retard the local replica to the actual signal to account for
doppler.
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Figure 29: Stair-step Representing Fractional Code Phase. After the overflow, the
samples are within the next chip of the sequence.
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Figure 30: Stair-step of P(Y) samples for C/A Chips for a sampling rate of 15MHz.
The P(Y) sample number relates to the P(Y) chip in the sequence. Shows how the
number of samples can change for each P(Y) chip for each C/A chip.
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III. Methodology

3.1

Preamble
This chapter’s goal is to describe the detection statistics and methods used to

demonstrate a proof-of-concept using a functioning software Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver that can authenticate the received signal. This is accomplished by focusing on the detection statistics between the Reference Authentication
Vector (RAV) and Estimated Authentication Vector (EAV) after synchronization of
the carrier phase and time of the open signals allowing for the encrypted signal’s chips
to be estimated.
First the focus will be on determining the detection statistics for the Delayed Authentication System (DAS) problem. This will cover the statistical method used as
well as some additional statistical information discovered during the research. Additionally, the overall DAS system and setup of the detection statistic will be discussed.
The next focus is on demonstrating how DAS performs between the RAV and EAV
with a chip error rate (CER) of zero for RAV (i.e. error free RAV). Statistical simulations were run for the following two cases: 1) EAV at Signal-to-Noise ratio (SNR)
of -30dB and varying vector lengths; 2) EAV of constant vector length with varying
SNR.
The reference station (RS), which produces RAV, is assumed to use a one-meter
dish antenna. The research focused on the achievable gain for multiple GNSS signals.
Using a one-meter dish antenna means the estimated RAV contains errors due to
negative SNR (in dB). Statistical simulations were used to demonstrate how DAS
performs between the RAV and EAV with degraded RAV data. The degraded data
simulation follows the same approach as the error free data.
Finally, the memory requirements for DAS are discussed based on the method
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of correlation since the RS responsible for generating the RAV stores and transmits
data to the participating user(s) (PU). Both the RS and PU store information and
the PU additionally perform correlation of the RAV data.

3.2

Authentication Detection Statistics
Detection theory is the application to detect signals in noise with the use of statis-

tical hypothesis testing. For this research, detection theory is used to determine the
authentication vector length and the authentication threshold value. Mathematically,
assume the N-point data set {x[0], x[1], . . . , x[N − 1]} is available. Then a function of
the data is formed, which can be expressed as T (x[0], x[1], . . . , x[N − 1]), and then a
decision is made based on its value. For detection theory, determining the function T
and mapping it into a decision is the central problem. The goal is to use the received
data as efficiently as possible in making the decision and be correct most of the time.
The analysis will be performed for the Global Positioning System (GPS) L1
Coarse-Acquisition (C/A) and P-Code legacy signal. The same procedure can be
used for other GNSS signals. Additionally, for DAS to work, there needs to be an
encrypted signal component and an open civilian signal component on the same carrier.
For this research, the Neyman-Pearson (NP) detector model is used. The NP
detector can be described as Equation (12).
N PDetector : δN P (χ, α) = argmaxPD (δ) 3 (PF (δ) ≤ α)
δ

(12)

δ : χ 7→ {0, 1} is a decision rule
The decision rule δ as seen in Equation (13) is based on zero being a non-authentic
signal or one being an authentic signal. For this research, if the signal is not authentic,
the chips the PU detected did not have the P(Y) code present. This entails that the
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received signal was either spoofed or some other problem was involved. The received
satnav signal being authentic means the signal was received from a true GPS satellite
that had the P(Y) code and both the RS and the PU was able to extract the P(Y)
chips correctly. As mentioned before, this same method can be used for other GNSS
signals that have the encrypted chips and the civilian chips transmitted synchronously
and spectrally separated.

Γ1 = {χ | δ(χ) = 1}

(13)

To start the statistical simulations for DAS, the probability of detection as seen
in Equation (14) and the probability of false detection as seen in Equation (15) must
be determined. From there a threshold can be calculated where the probability of
false detection is 10−3 which will be expanded on in Section 3.2.1 [35].
Z
PD (δ) =

p1 (χ) dχ

(14)

p0 (χ) dχ

(15)

Γ1

Z
PF (δ) =
Γ1

3.2.1

Detection Statistic Setup for DAS

As previously described, DAS is designed using a RS and a PU. The RS uses a
parabolic antenna to achieve a power gain of the incoming signal to reduce the CER of
the satellite navigation (satnav) signal. The PU is a standard GNSS receiver that can
access the Analog-to-Digital converter (ADC) sample level and numerically-controlled
oscillators (NCOs). Authenticity of the signal can be determined by sending the
estimated encrypted signal or RAV from the reference receiver and correlating with
the estimated encrypted signal or EAV on the PU.
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To describe the overall setup of DAS, it first must be known that the RS and
PUs are receiving the satnav signal from the same satellite. The RS is transmitting a
reduced chip error ‘truth’ due to achieving the SNR gain from the parabolic antenna.
This is with the assumption that the RS is never spoofed. A decision device is used
on the RAV to take the incoming symbols of varying sign and magnitude and convert
them to symbols of {−1, 1}. The PU is either receiving the authentic military signal
component or not. The RAV and EAV are correlated and based on a threshold value,
signal authenticity is determined. The setup for the detection statistics can be viewed
in the block diagram in Figure 31. Additionally, each detection simulation was run
with 100k Monte Carlo simulations and averaged to estimate better results.

Figure 31: Detection statistic block for DAS. The RAV Source is transmitting the
‘truth’ due to achieving a SNR gain from a dish antenna. A decision device is used
on the RAV to take the incoming P(Y) symbols of varying sign and magnitude and
convert them to symbols of {−1, 1}. The EAV Source is either receiving the authentic
P(Y) code or not and is shown in the figure as a switch. The RAV and EAV vectors
are correlated and based on a threshold value, signal authenticity is determined.

60

Additionally, the Authentication Decision Rule with the correlation of X̂RAV and
XEAV can be seen in Figure 32. The figure shows the correlation of the vector
from RAV as the estimated truth vector due to the decision device determining if a
symbol to be of {−1, 1}. The cross-correlations are squared providing a chi-squared
distribution to normalize for having either a ‘-1’ or ‘1’ being the correct chip.

Figure 32: Authentication Decision Rule expanded. This figure shows the correlation
of the vector from RAV as the estimated truth vector due to the decision device and
the vector from EAV. The cross-correlation is squared to have a value that is always
positive to compare against a threshold. The correlation values then move to the
Authentication Determination block.
The signal detection problem for the authentication statistic is crafted similar to
a typical GNSS signal acquisition statistic [16]. The acquisition problem is set up
as a hypothesis test, testing the hypothesis where H1 represents the signal is present
versus the hypothesis H0 that the signal is not present. The test statistic for the
derivations are:
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(16)

Under hypothesis H1, and
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i=1

(17)

Under hypothesis H0, where ‘l0 is the test statistic, T H is the threshold, M is
the number of in-phase and quadraphase samples summed prior to squaring (does
not apply for this scenario and therefore is always ‘10 ), K is the number of samples
summed after squaring [16].
Since the RS is transmitting the ‘truth’, for the statistic setup, RAV will have two
‘reference’ methods that are evaluated. First, RAV will be evaluated using an error
free ‘reference’ to demonstrate an overall feasibility of the method for authentication
and is discussed in Section 3.3. Later, the statistical setup will be evaluated using
a degraded ‘reference’ that represents how the system is expected to perform and is
discussed in Section 3.5.

3.2.2

Additional Statistical Data

For this research, some additional statistical data was discovered that does not
directly impact the research but provides additional information that was used to
determine better results. This research also helped determine the basis for the required power gain from the antenna. For this portion of the research, authentication
vector length is referred to as segment size and will be mentioned as segment size only
for this section. The first information discovered was that as segment size increased
the match percentage for the highest correlation increased. The term ‘First N ’ is to
denote a specific number of possible segments with the highest correlation values. An
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example of this can be viewed in Figure 33.

Figure 33: Correlation example for a segment size of 3. The figure shows a correct
segment and that same segment with noise where First N is the possible segments (N)
based on the highest correclation value. Due to the noise changing the segment, the
correlation values do not match. Both segments with the highest correlation value
are different and, in this case, it would determine segment 7 to be the best when the
correct segment is segment 3. The segment with the highest correlation value would
be passed as the correct sequence(s) based on the number of segments to be passed.
Figure 33 provides a simplified example as to how noise can affect the correlation
value and choosing the correct result. Next the size of the segment was evaluated
to determine its correlation characteristics. As seen in Figure 34, as the size of the
segment increased, the match percent for the highest correlations increased. This
shows a relationship with segment size and correlation gain. When changing the
SNR of the incoming signal, an overall shape similar to the changing segment size
plot can be seen when comparing Figure 34 to Figure 35.
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Figure 34: Match Percent with First N Method and Sub-Segment size of 5 and varying
segment size. This plot was accomplished with a trial size of 100,000. The X-axis
is the Normalized First N or how many segments with the highest correlation values
(in percentage) are being passed. The Y-axis shows the average match percentage for
the segments passed. A correct segment implies each bit ({−1, 1}) in the segment
matches and one bit off in the segment would determine there was not a match. This
figure shows that as the segment size increases, the match percentage for the first
segment passed with the highest correlation increases.
Figure 35 shows that as the SNR increases, the match percentage for the first
segment passed with the highest correlation increases. Now that a relationship with
segment size and SNR was determined based on a match of the full segment, the next
focus was on determining if there is a trend when checking a match for individual bits
based on passing multiple segments. From Figure 36, it was determined that there
was no gain when passing multiple segments based on the highest correlation when
checking the individual bits. When a match is determined based on the individual
bits ({−1, 1}) and averaged for all segments passed as the number of segments passed
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Figure 35: Match Percent with First N Method and Sub-Segment size of 5 and
varying SNR. This plot was accomplished with a trial size of 100,000. The X-axis is
the Normalized First N or how many segments with the highest correlation values (in
percentage) are being passed. The Y-axis shows the average match percentage for
the segments passed. A correct segment implies each bit ({−1, 1}) in the segment
matches and one bit off in the segment would determine there was not a match. This
figure shows that as the SNR increases, the match percentage for the first segment
passed with the highest correlation increases.
increases the average match percentage per bit remained the same.
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Figure 36: Match percentage based on number of segments passed for a segment size
of 5120. This plot was accomplished with a trial size of 100,000. The X-axis is the
number of segments passed based on having the highest correlation value. The Y-axis
shows the average match percentage for the segments passed. A match is determined
based on the individual bits ({−1, 1}) and averaged based on all segments passed.
This figure shows that as the number of segments passed increases the average match
percentage per bit remained relatively the same.
3.3

Analysis for Error-Free RAV
First, the system is evaluated with an error free RAV, and -30 dB SNR for the

incoming signal at the participating receiver. The detection problem was set up
as described in Section 3.2 with a focus on finding the threshold for a probability of
detection above 90% and a probability of false detection of 0.1% for given SNR values
and authentication vector lengths. Section 3.5.1 covers a detection problem with
varying Authentication Vector lengths and Section 3.5.2 covers a detection problem
with varying EAV SNR values.
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3.3.1

H0 and H1 PDFs for Varying Vector Lengths with EAV at -30
dB SNR

To determine an appropriate Authentication vector length for the error free RAV,
the detection problem was set up where H1 represents the signal is present versus the
H0 where the signal is not present. The vector lengths were chosen to be in 1 ms
blocks with a focus on using the GNSS signal of GPS L1 P(Y) code. The procedure
is the same for the other encrypted GNSS signals. More information on the signal
structures can be reviewed in Section 2.2.
Figure 37 shows the probability density functions (PDFs) for H0 and H1 for different Authentication Vector lengths. As the Authentication Vector length increases,
the PDFs shifts to the right for H1 while still being centered at zero for H0 (or asymptotic for the Chi-squared distribution). Additionally, both H0’s and H1’s standard
deviations increase viewed by the widening of the Chi-squared distributions. Table
1 shows the error free RAV threshold and probability of detection for the different
Authentication Vector sizes at 0.1% probability of false detection. The values found
in Table 1 were determined using a simulation method and not analytically. For the
error free RAV, assuming an incoming signal at -30 dB SNR at the participating
receiver, given a false alarm probability of 0.1%, an Authentication Vector length of
30690 or 3 ms of the GPS P(Y) code is required to achieve a probability of detection
greater than 90%.

3.3.2

H0 and H1 PDFs as a function of SNR

To determine the impact of different EAV SNRs with an error free RAV, the
detection problem with a vector length of 10230 or 1 ms was chosen for the GNSS
signal of GPS L1 P(Y) code. The analysis will be similar for other encrypted GNSS
signals.
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Figure 37: Zoomed-in PDFs of H0 and H1 for varying vector sizes with error free RAV
and EAV set to -30 dB SNR. The figure shows that as the Authentication Vector size
increases the probability of detection increases with a probability of false detection
threshold of 0.1%.
Figure 38 shows the PDFs for H0 and H1 for different EAV SNR values. As the
SNR value increases, the PDFs for H1 shift very slightly to the right or have a small
increase in correlation mean value. This shift to the right is very minor and for the
SNR values that are achievable for GNSS signal, the mean values are being viewed
as consistent both H0 and H1. H0’s and H1’s standard deviations, however, decrease
as SNR increases viewed by the narrowing of the Chi-squared distributions. Table 2
shows the error free RAV threshold and probability of detection for the different
EAV SNR values at 0.1% probability of false detection confirming what is viewed in
Figure 38.
Figure 39 below shows a trend for the Error Free RAV threshold and Probability
of detection for Authentication Vector length of 10230.
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Table 1: Error Free RAV threshold and Probability of detection for the different
Authentication Vector lengths at 0.1% probability of false detection. The table shows
that an Authentication Vector size of 30690 is required to achieve a greater than 90%
probability of detection at a probability of false detection threshold of 0.1%.

Table 2: Error Free RAV threshold and Probability of detection for Authentication
Vector length of 10230 at 0.1% probability of false detection. The table shows the
results of different EAV received signal SNR values. The table shows a minor decrease
in the mean value as the EAV received signal SNR increases. Additionally, the table
shows as the EAV received signal SNR increases, the standard deviation and the
trhershold value decreases.
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Figure 38: Zoomed in PDFs of H0 and H1 for vector length of 10230 and varying
EAV received signal SNR values with error free RAV. The figure shows that as the
SNR value for EAV increases, the standard deviations for both H0’s and H1’s PDFs
decrease viewed by the narrowing of the Chi-squared distributions.
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Figure 39: Authentication Vector length of 10230 for Error Free RAV. This figure
shows Probability of detection for varying SNRs of the Error Free RAV threshold for
Authentication Vector length of 10230 at 0.1% probability of false detection. As SNR
increases the probability of detection increases until -25 dB SNR where it maxes out.
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3.4

RAV with Parabolic Antenna
For computing RAV at the RS, using an antenna with higher gain increases SNR,

thus decreasing its error rate. As mentioned in Chapter II, there are multiple methods
to achieve an increased signal gain. This research focused on using a one-meter
parabolic antenna to achieve ∼ 20 dB gain. The one-meter size is preferred to reduce
DAS complexity and cost, since a steerable antenna is needed to track each GNSS
signal in view. The one-meter size also allows the RS to be more portable than a
two-meter or three-meter antenna allowing the RS to be used in a wide range of
applications.

3.4.1

Parabolic Antenna Gain Theory

The parabolic antenna gain can be calculated from a knowledge of the diameter of
the reflecting surface, the wavelength of the signal, and an estimate of the efficiency
of the antenna. The standard formula for the parabolic reflector antenna gain is [36]:

G = 10log10 k(

πD 2
)
λ

(18)

where:
G is the gain over an isotropic source in dB
k is the efficiency factor which is generally around 50% to 60%
D is the diameter of the parabolic reflector in meters
λ is the wavelength of the signal in meters
From the parabolic gain equation, it can be seen that very large gains can be
achieved if sufficiently large reflectors are used. As the gain of the parabolic antenna
increases the beamwidth falls, thus increasing pointing accuracy. The beamwidth is
defined as the points where the power falls to half of the maximum or -3 dB on a
radiation pattern polar diagram. The half power beamwidth can be estimated from
the following formula [36]:
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BeamwidthΨ =

70λ
D

(19)

where:
Beamwidth is the aperture angle in degrees
D is the diameter of the parabolic reflector
λ is the wavelength of the signal
To determine the gain achieved, the frequencies of multiple encrypted GNSS signals were evaluated and can be seen for a 1-meter dish in Table 3. The gain from a
1-meter parabolic antenna for the GNSS signals presented range from 19.2 dB and
21.9 dB. The beamwidth for the 1-meter antenna is also small enough to require the
antenna have a mechanical actuator to position the antenna within the beamwidth
angle. The beamwidths for the 1-meter dish are large enough to accommodate coarse
steering to maintain pointing to the desired GNSS signal.
Table 3: Attainable gain from a 1-meter parabolic antenna for various GNSS signals.
The gain from a 1-meter parabolic antenna for the GNSS signals presented range
from 19.2 dB to 21.9 dB. The L1 GNSS signals for both GPS and GLONASS are
above 20 dB for better antenna efficeincy values.

With the gains determined from Table 3, the minimum RAV SNRs can be seen in
Table 4. From the GNSS signals evaluated, the RAV SNR from a 1-meter parabolic
antenna for the GNSS signals presented range from -2.8 dB to –14.3 dB with an
73

average of -7.4 dB. To simplify this for the purpose of this research and to account for
additional variables a value of -10 dB SNR will be used for the expected RAV SNR.
Table 4: Minimum SNR values for various GNSS signals received with 1-meter
parabolic antenna. The RAV received signal SNR from a 1-meter parabolic antenna
for the GNSS signals presented range from -2.8 dB to –14.3 dB with an average of
-7.4 dB.

3.4.2

Theoretical CER as a Function of Power Loss

Another consideration on the required antenna gain was the power loss in dB for
the CER. Considering a generic signals model for a GNSS signals consisting of an
open signal and an encrypted component, the CER Pc can be determined as [37]:
s
Pc = Q

2Eb
σn2

!
(20)

where Q(.) is the tail-distribution function of the standard normal distribution and
is related to the complementary error function erfc(.).
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Figure 40a shows the theoretical CER for a Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK)
signal for commonly used GNSS signal chipping-rates Rc with the worst possible CER
being 50%. Therefore, a high Carrier-to-Noise-Density Ratio (C/N0 ) is required for
reliable estimation. For example, with a BPSK(1) signal, like GPS L1 C/A, at least
59 dBHz is required to ensure a better than 10% CER when estimating it as an
unknown sequence.
The power loss due to false estimation ∆L depends on the CER:

∆L =

1
1 − 2Pc

(21)

Figure 40b shows the power loss ∆L for different chipping-rates Rc. The 3 dB loss
is considered the minimum acceptable loss for GNSS tracking. Figure 40b emphasizes
that, depending on the signal used, a C/N0 between 54 and 74 dBHz is needed for
reliable sequence estimation and reuse for navigation [38], [37].

Figure 40: (a) Theoretical CER for a BPSK signal and (b) power loss ∆L for different chipping-rates Rc . Figure a shows the higher the chipping-rate, the shorter the
integration time and therefore less energy is available for estimation, which degrades
the CER. Figure b at least 53.7 dBHz is required for a BPSK(1) signal, and 63.7
dBHz for a BPSK(10) signal, to achieve a loss below 3 dB [37].
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3.5

Authentication using RAV with Degraded Truth
Now that RAV has a defined SNR value from Section 3.4.1 for multiple GNSS

signals, the system is evaluated with degraded truth. The RAV data signals truth
will be degraded to -10 dB SNR to be correlated with the -30 dB SNR GNSS signal.
The detection problem was set up again as described in Section 3.2 with a focus on
finding the threshold, SNR, and authentication length for a probability of detection
above 90% and a probability of false detection of 0.1%. Section 3.5.1 covers a detection problem with varying Authentication Vector lengths and Section 3.5.2 covers a
detection problem with varying EAV SNR values.

3.5.1

H0 and H1 PDFs for Varying Vector Lengths with EAV at -30
dB SNR

To determine an appropriate authentication vector length for the degraded truth
RAV, the detection problem was set up where H1 represents the signal is present
versus the H0 where the signal is not present. The vector lengths were chosen to be
in 1 ms blocks with a focus on using the GNSS signal of GPS L1 P(Y) code. Again,
the procedure is the same for the other encrypted GNSS signals and more information
on the signal structures can be reviewed in Section 2.2.
Figure 41 shows the PDFs for H0 and H1 for different authentication vector
lengths. As the authentication vector length increases, the PDFs shifts to the right
for H1 while still being centered at zero for H0. Additionally, both H0’s and H1’s
standard deviations increase viewed by the widening of the Chi-squared distributions.
Table 5 shows the degraded truth RAV threshold and probability of detection for the
different authentication vector sizes at 0.1% probability of false detection. For the
degraded truth RAV, an authentication vector length of 358050 or 35 ms of the GPS
P(Y) code is required to achieve a probability of detection greater than 90% for the
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threshold determined by the probability of false detection at 0.1%. Additional probability of detection can be achieved for an Authentication Vector length of 409200
or 40 ms of the GPS P(Y) code and choosing the appropriate authentication vector
length could be an algorithm determined situationally by DAS providing that the
system can be adaptable if increased probability or SNR is required.

Figure 41: Zoomed in PDFs of H0 and H1 for varying vector sizes with degraded truth
RAV and EAV set to -30dB SNR. The figure shows that as the vector length increases
the PDF shifts to the right for H1 and both H0’s and H1’s standard deviations increase
viewed by the widening of the Chi-squared distributions.
Figure 42 shows a trend for different SNR values and correlations with chips that
are stored as sign and magnitude or sign only.
3.5.2

H0 and H1 PDFs as a function of SNR

To determine the impact of different EAV SNRs for a degraded truth RAV, the
detection problem with a vector length of 153450 or 15ms was chosen for the GNSS
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Table 5: Degraded truth RAV threshold and Probability of detection for the different
Authentication Vector lengths at 0.1% probability of false detection. The table shows
that an Authentication Vector size of 358050 is required to achieve a greater than 90%
probability of detection at a probability of false detection threshold of 0.1%.

signal of GPS L1 P(Y) code. Again, the procedure is the same for the other encrypted
GNSS signals. Figure 43 shows the PDFs for H0 and H1 for different EAV SNR values.
As the SNR value increases, the PDFs for H1 shift very slightly to the right or have
a small increase in correlation mean value. This shift to the right is very minor and
for the SNR values that are achievable for GNSS signal, the mean values are being
viewed as consistent both H0 and H1. H0’s and H1’s standard deviations, however,
decrease as SNR increases viewed by the narrowing of the Chi-squared distributions.
Table 6 shows the degraded truth RAV threshold and probability of detection for the
different EAV SNR values at 0.1% probability of false detection confirming what is
viewed in Figure 43.
For the degraded truth RAV, it functions the same as the error free RAV but
requires a much larger authentication vector length to achieve the same performance.
This allows for trade-offs based upon the needs of the system or the expected environment.
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Figure 42: Degraded truth RAV threshold and Probability of detection for the different Authentication Vector lengths at 0.1% probability of false detection and varying
SNRs. The figure shows that two authentication vector lengths of 358050 and 409200
for a PU SNR ranging for -35 dB to -15 dB for Both Sign and magnitude correlations
and Sign only correlations.
Table 6: Degraded truth RAV threshold and Probability of detection for Authentication Vector length of 153450 at 0.1% probability of false detection. The table shows
the results of different EAV received signal SNR values. The table shows a minor
decrease in the mean value as the EAV received signal SNR increases. Additionally,
the table shows as the EAV received signal SNR increases, the standard deviation
and the trhershold value decreases.
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Figure 43: Zoomed in PDFs of H0 and H1 for vector length of 153450 and varying
EAV received signal SNR values with degraded truth RAV. The figure shows that
as the SNR value for EAV increases, the standard deviations for both H0’s and H1’s
PDFs decrease viewed by the narrowing of the Chi-squared distributions.
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3.6

DAS Memory Requirement Analysis
The necessary authentication vector length discovered in Section 3.5 was based

on sign-only RAV data, in which only a bit representing -1 or 1 was used. The
authentication vector was then correlated with sign and magnitude EAV data, which
for simulation purposes was a 32-bit value in MATLABTM . The next step is to
determine if RAV and EAV should focus on storing sign only or sign and magnitude
for better performance and efficiency based on the memory requirement necessary.
When calculating the probability of detection for a sign-only RAV and sign-only EAV
versus a sign only RAV and 32-bit sign and magnitude EAV the result where the same.
It was determined that this was acting as expected as noted by the problem statement
and equations below:
Let:
y1ms denote ”mag and sign”,
y1s denote ”sign only”,
n is a form of noise or residual error
y1ms = y1s + n
where:

E[x1 ∗ y1ms ] = E[x1 ∗ y1s ] + E[x1 ∗ n]
= E[x1 ∗ y1s ] + E[x1 ] ∗ E[n]

(22)

= E[x1 ∗ y1s ]
Therefore, the focus will be on when both RAV and EAV are sign and magnitude
or both RAV and EAV are sign only. Keeping the probability of false detection at
0.1% to determine the threshold for a probability of detection above 90%, two vector
lengths for each correlation method where calculated that had the closest matches
for probability of detection. Table 7 shows that with RAV and EAV data being both
sign and magnitude requires ∼70% of the vector length for RAV and EAV data being
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sign only.
Table 7: RAV / EAV Memory requirements based on a 32-bit sign and magnitude.
The table shows two possible vector lengths for both the RAV and EAV being sign
and magnitude or sign only that are comparable based on the probability of detection.

For this part of the research, it is assumed that the statistical correlations are
similar to GPS correlations where after 2-bits there is a loss of 0.5dB [12].
Next a comparison of sign and magnitude versus sign only for both RAV and EAV
were evaluated with a focus on memory usage over time. Since the distance from the
RS to the PU is unknown at this time as well as the data transmission rate used the
following assumptions are used to calculate the memory requirements. As a worst
case scenario, assuming the PUs are within 100 km radius from the RS, there is a 20
ms transmission latency and a 2 ms receiver latency. This will be further discussed
in Chapter IV. For this, Table 8 shows multiple memory allocations required for
different PU storage times as it will have to store the estimated encrypted data until
it received the estimated encrypted data from the RS for correlation. The 1-bit sign
correlation storage requirements are roughly 75% of the 2-bit magnitude and sign
memory allocation requirements.
The following formulas with an example for filling out Table 8 are below:
Let:
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Sign-Mag / Sign-Mag = 2-bits
Sign Only/ Sign Only= 1-bit



V ectorLength) ∗ (#of bits)
Memory Allocation(1ms) =
(byteconversion) ∗ (kilobyteconversion)


245520) ∗ (2)
Memory Allocation(1ms) =
(8) ∗ (1000)



(23)

Memory Allocation(timeinms) = Memory Allocation(1ms) ∗ (timeinms)
Memory Allocation(25s) = 61.38KB ∗ (25)

Table 8: RAV / EAV Memory Requirements over Periods of Time. The table shows
the two possible vector lengths for both the RAV and EAV as in Table 7 but with
multiple storage times.

Finally, a comparison of sign and magnitude versus sign only for both the RS and
PU were generated with a focus on memory usage at the worst-case time of 40 ms
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for multiple GNSS signals. Table 9 shows that for 12 GNSS signals, the PU would
possibly have to store an addition 0.6 Megabytes to 1.3 Megabytes worth of data
for sign and magnitude compared to the lowest memory requirement of sign only.
Authenticating 12 satnav signals at a time would only be useful to speed up the
timeframe for signal authentication. Signal authentication can also be accomplished
one satnav at a time to reduce the memory requirements. Though Table 7 – Table 9
focus on the PU memory requirements, there are additional side channel requirements
based on the RS transmission of the estimated encrypted data that is outside of the
scope of this research.
Table 9: RAV / EAV Memory Requirements for Multiple Satnav Signals. The table
shows the two possible vector correlation methods for both the RAV and EAV for 40
milliseconds of time with multiple GNSS signals.
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3.7

Statistics Results
The recommended requirements based upon finding for this research for RAV and

EAV can be viewed in Table 10 based on the statistical simulations performed. The
only difference is that the RS may be designed to authenticate more satnav signals at
once where the PUs may be designed to authenticate 1 – 3 satnav signals at a time.
Table 10: RAV / EAV Recommended Requirements for DAS based on a one-meter
parabolic antenna for RAV receiver.
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IV. Results and Analysis

4.1

Preamble
This chapter’s goal is to verify and validate the authentication methodologies

using a simulated receiver implemented in MATLABTM . As mentioned, Delayed
Authentication System (DAS) seeks to provide confidence in the signal’s authenticity
allowing the receiver to operate normally, and with the assurance that the signal
being tracked is authentic. It accomplishes this by synchronization of the carrier
phase and time of the open signals using code tracking using the methods described
in Section 2.8.1. This chapter focuses on after the code boundaries are aligned and
the chip sequence is being estimated.
To reiterate, DAS employs a Reference Authentication Vector (RAV) that is generated by a nearby reference station (RS) and broadcast to all participating user(s)
(PU). A PU generates an Estimated Authentication Vector (EAV) from the satellite signal that it receives. The RS employs a one-meter dish antenna to achieve a
20 dB gain of the incoming signal – thereby allowing it to estimate the encrypted
spreading code chips of the military Global Positioning System (GPS) signal (i.e.
P(Y) code) with relatively low chip error rate. The PU employs standard Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signal acquisition and tracking techniques, with
the exception of computing EAV. By sending the RAV from the reference station and
correlating with the EAV, a PU can determine the authenticity of the signal.
This chapter will first show the results of estimating the GPS L1 P(Y) chips using
simulated data. After using simulated satellite data, live-sky data will be used and
modified to match the expected Signal-to-Noise ratio (SNR) for reference station and
participating receiver system. Finally, the stored estimated P(Y) chips in a PU will
be correlated with the estimated P(Y) chips from RS via a side channel.
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4.1.1

Implementation using Simulated Data

The focus on this section is on estimating the P(Y) chips for the GPS signal for
L1 C/A and L1 P(Y) using simulated satellite data. The simulated data for this
research is created by simulating a satellite transmitting the signal and estimating
the effects of going through the atmosphere before being received by the front end.
This is accomplished though object-oriented MATLABTM code provided at Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT) [39]. The satellite is given motion with a dynamics
profile as seen in Figure 44. This is to simulate a GNSS satellite in orbit and the same
dynamics profile was used for all simulated data in Section 4.1.2 through Section 4.1.5.

Figure 44: Dynamic Profile for the satellite used for all simulated data replicating
motion of a GNSS satellite. This figure shows a 1 second timeframe for the line of
site motion of the simulated satellite. This shows that the simulated satellite has 10
m/s line of site motion to simulate a GNSS satellite in orbit.
As described in Section 2.8, the Code numerically-controlled oscillator (NCO) was
used to find the phase for the C/A and P(Y) chips. This allowed the receiver to align
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the chip phases for C/A and P(Y) chips allowing for the estimation of the P(Y) chips.
The C/A and P(Y) phases and chip samples can be seen in Figure 45 below. This
figure shows that there are 10 P(Y) phase cycles for every one C/A phase cycle as
seen by the saw-tooth plots. Additionally, the figure shows the chip samples related
to their amplitude. For this figure, a simulated signal that is 10 dB above the noise
floor was used to show clean representation of the chips.

Figure 45: Phase and Chip Samples for GPS L1 C/A and P(Y). This figure shows
the GPS L1 C/A and P(Y) phases by the saw-tooth plots. This shows that there
are 10 P(Y) phases for every 1 C/A phase. Additionally, the figure shows the chip
samples related to their amplitude from a signal that is 10 dB above the noise floor
to show clean representation of the chips.
The block diagram for determining the estimated encrypted chips can be seen in
Figure 46. The RS and PU process for estimating the encrypted signal is identical
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except the signal from the satellite for reference station will have a higher SNR based
on the antenna used. The RS has a 20 dB signal gain over PU due to using a 1-meter
parabolic antenna. A decision device is used to take the incoming encrypted symbols
of varying sign and magnitude and convert them to symbols of  {−1, 1}. The bits
are then stored, and the difference afterwards is that the RS will transmit the stored
bits through a side channel to a PU. From here, the PU will use the stored and
timestamped EAV and correlate the incoming timestamped RAV from the RS. This
section is focusing on the results up to the stored bits.

Figure 46: RAV/EAV Block Diagram. This figure shows the RAV/EAV block diagram in which the gain for the two vectors are different. The RS/PU receives the
signal from the satellite with an SNR based on the antenna used. The RS has a 20
dB gain over PS. A decision device is used to take the incoming encrypted symbols of
varying sign and magnitude and convert them to symbols of  {−1, 1}. The bits are
then stored, and the difference afterwards is that the stored RAV will be transmitted
through a side channel to the PU where the EAV will be correlated to the incoming
bits for the given time-frame.

4.1.2

Simulation of RAV Estimated from a Noiseless Signal

First RAV simulation was run with no added thermal noise to verify that the
system was working as intended. Figure 47 shows the oscilloscope and spectrum
analyzer with no noise. From the oscilloscope, the symbols of  {−1, 1} can easily
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be seen. The spectrum analyzer shows the combination of L1 C/A and L1 P(Y).
From Figure 47, the individual bits can be viewed clearly as well as the signals being
combined.

Figure 47: Oscilloscope in relative volts units over time and spectrum analyzer for
received simulated data with no thermal noise. Oscilloscope shows clean +1 and -1
bits and clear signs of motion (signal phase changing slowly over time). The spectrum
analyzer shows the combination of L1 C/A and L1 P(Y).

To conclude verifying that the simulation was extracting the encrypted bits as
intended with no added noise, the estimated P(Y) chips were compared to the P(Y)
chips sent out of the simulated satellite. Figure 48 shows that throughout the 59second run, after phase/frequency lock was achieved, which took ∼2 seconds, all bits
were estimated correctly for each 1ms ensemble of estimated chips. This means that
out of the 10230 P(Y) chips broadcasted in a 1ms timeframe, all estimated P(Y) chips
for that 1ms timeframe were correct. Equation (24) shows how match percent was
calculated for authentication vector.
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M atchP ercent(1ms)) =

(1 − #ChipErrors)
10230

where:
ChipErrors(1ms)) =

X

((EstimatedChipSequence ∗ KnownChipSequence) < 0)
(24)

Figure 48: Match percent of the simulated data with no noise. This figure shows that
there is a 100% match of the estimated P(Y) signal and the transmitted P(Y) signal
from the simulated satellite.

4.1.3

Simulation of RAV Estimated from a 0 dB SNR Signal

With the no added noise, the simulation was proven to work as intended. The
next step is to add noise to simulate a 0 dB SNR signal. This acts to simulate a signal
received from a 3-meter parabolic dish and will also give insight that the simulation
is working as intended with an SNR that will have a low Bit Error Rate (BER), or
for the purposes of GNSS, chip error rate (CER). Figure 49 shows the oscilloscope
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and spectrum analyzer with 0 dB SNR or a thermal noise power of -160 dBW based
on a signal power of -160 dBW. From the oscilloscope, the symbols of  {−1, 1} are
more difficult to detect visually. The spectrum analyzer shows the combination of L1
C/A and L1 P(Y) with the noise floor at -160 dBW.

Figure 49: Oscilloscope in relative volts units over time and spectrum analyzer for
received simulated data at 0 dB SNR. Oscilloscope does not show clean +1 and -1
bits as expected. The spectrum analyzer shows the combination of L1 C/A and L1
P(Y) and with the inclusion of the noise floor, the side lobes are below the thermal
noise floor and therefore visually undetectable.
Additionally, the simulated signal at 0 dB SNR shows high correlation magnitude for the correlators after frequency/phase lock as seen in Figure 50. This shows
that synchronization with the incoming signal was achieved allowing the receiver to
generate GNSS observables and retrieve the navigation message.
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Figure 50: Correlators for Prompt, Early, and Late over time for 0 dB SNR. The figure
shows very little noise effects for each correlator and a high correlation magnitude
after achieving phase lock.
Figure 51 shows that after ∼2 seconds, phase lock was achieved for the simulated
code. This means that the L1 C/A and L1 P(Y) boundaries are aligned allowing for
proper estimation of the P(Y) chips as described in Section 2.8.1.
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Figure 51: Phase Lock Indicator over time for 0 dB SNR. The figure shows that after
lock, the phase lock indicator stays constant at +1, showing that phase lock has been
achieved after 2 seconds of time over the period of 59 seconds.
For the 0 dB SNR simulated data run, the estimated Carrier-to-Noise-Density
Ratio (C/N0 ) average was 67.7 dB-Hz after phase lock. The simulated receiver’s
estimated C/N0 average ended up being non-linear if the SNR was high enough due
to using the lock detector to estimate the C/N0 as discussed in Section 2.3.2. For
all other values, the estimated C/N0 values were correct and since the research was
focused on RAV at -10 dB and EAV at -30dB, this was not a concern. This is discussed
in more detail in Section 4.2 With 0 dB SNR at a 50MHz bandwidth with a known
max C/N0 at ∼68 dB-Hz, the results are as expected with the known irregularity
with the estimated C/N0 from the MATLABTM code.
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Figure 52: Estimated C/N0 for simulated data for 0 dB SNR. This figure shows for
the simulated data that the average C/N0 is 67.7 dB-Hz.
Finally, after frequency/phase lock, the RAV begins to be stored by estimation of
the P(Y) chips. Figure 53 shows that there is a low CER for 0 dB SNR. This is useful
for the research since this is the SNR the live-sky signal is expected to be at when
received with a 3-meter dish antenna, as will be discussed more later. Overall, the
CER is very low at 1.4% on average over a period of 57 seconds after the 2 seconds
needed to achieve frequency/phase lock. This means that at 0 dB SNR, the estimated
P(Y) chips in RAV will be correct ∼98% of the time.
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Figure 53: Match Percent for 0 dB SNR after Frequency/Phase Lock. This figure
shows the average Chip Error Rate is 1.4% and Chip Success Rate is 98.6% for 0 dB
SNR.
4.1.4

Simulation of RAV Estimated from a -10 dB SNR Signal

RAV for this research is intended to be created based on a receiver with a 1-meter
parabolic antenna with a 20 dB gain. To test RAV based on the design of the research
as mention in Section 3.4, the noise for the simulation was adjusted to provide a -10
dB SNR. This is still intended to provide a CER of around 20-30%. Figure 54 shows
the oscilloscope and spectrum analyzer with a simulated signal received at -10 dB
SNR or a thermal noise of -150 dBW based on a signal power of -160 dBW. From the
oscilloscope, the symbols of  {−1, 1} are difficult to detect visually with higher spikes
than the oscilloscope at 0dB SNR. The spectrum analyzer shows the combination of
L1 C/A and L1 P(Y) with the noise floor at -150 dBW. Much of the side lobes for
C/A and P(Y) are difficult to detect or disappear completely under the noise floor.
As expected, the simulated receiver at -10 dB SNR shows high correlation magni-
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Figure 54: Oscilloscope in relative volts units over time and spectrum analyzer for
received simulated data at -10 dB SNR. Oscilloscope does not show a clean +1 and
-1 bits with larger spikes than at 0 dB SNR. The spectrum analyzer shows the combination of L1 C/A and L1 P(Y) with the inclusion of the noise floor which drowns
out the wider bands even more than the 0 dB SNR spectrum analyzer figure.
tude for the correlators after frequency/phase lock as seen in Figure 55. This shows
that synchronization with the incoming signal at -10 dB SNR was achieved allowing
the receiver to generate GNSS observables. The noticeable difference from determining RAV at 0 dB SNR and RAV at -10 dB SNR for the correlators is the additional
noise in the prompt and late correlators.
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Figure 55: Correlators for Prompt, Early, and Late over time for -10 dB SNR. The
figure shows a larger noise effect for each correlator when compared to the 0 dB
SNR correlators while the average remains roughly the same. Additionally, the figure
shows a high correlation magnitude after achieving phase lock.
As with the RAV received at 0 dB SNR, the RAV received at -10 dB SNR shows
that after ∼2 seconds, phase lock was achieved for the simulated data as seen in
Figure 56. As mentioned, this is very important for RAV/EAV as without phase
lock, the boundaries of C/A and P(Y) cannot be determined and therefore there will
not be proper estimation of the encrypted signal.
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Figure 56: Phase Lock Indicator over time for -10 dB SNR. The figure shows that
after lock, the phase lock indicator stays constant at +1, showing that phase lock has
been achieved after 2 seconds of time over the period of 59 seconds.
For the -10 dB SNR simulated data run, the estimated C/N0 average was 62.8
dB-Hz after phase lock. The simulated receiver’s estimation of C/N0 appears to
still affect the simulated results vs the theoretical results but is getting closer to the
expected value of 67.0 dB-Hz. There are additional variables that may be affecting the
estimated C/N0 , but it is matching the expected trend of decreasing as SNR decreases.
The relationship between C/N0 and SNR and the formulas used for theoretical C/N0
can be reviewed in Section 2.3.2.
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Figure 57: Estimated C/N0 for simulated data for -10 dB SNR. This figure shows for
the simulated data that the average C/N0 is 62.8 dB-Hz.
Finally, after frequency/phase lock, the RAV can begin to store the estimated
P(Y) chips and the match percent for the RAV simulated data can be determined.
Figure 58 shows that the data is within the expected CER for -10 dB SNR. The CER
is at 24.3% on average over a period of 57 seconds. This shows that for a -10 dB SNR
RAV the estimated P(Y) chips will be correct ∼75% of the time.
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Figure 58: Match Percent for -10 dB SNR after Frequency/Phase Lock. This figure
shows the average Chip Error Rate is 24.3% and Chip Success Rate is 75.7% for -10dB
SNR.
4.1.5

Simulation of EAV Estimated from a -30 dB SNR Signal

EAV for this research is intended to be determined using a PU performing traditional GNSS receiver signal tracking techniques, that has DAS implemented so that
it can produce an EAV and correlate it with the corresponding RAV received from
the nearest RS. To test the EAV based on the design of the research as mention in
Section 2.5.1 and Section 2.6.1, the noise for the simulation was adjusted to provide
a -30 dB SNR. This is where there will be a large drop in CER but should remain
a few percentages above 50% as that is the theoretical minimum CER for a GNSS
signal. This is due to the random chance of either perceiving a ‘1’ or a ‘-1’ over a
long period of time. Figure 59 shows the oscilloscope and spectrum analyzer with
a signal received at -30 dB SNR or a thermal noise of -130 dBW based on a signal
power of -160 dBW. From the oscilloscope, the symbols of  {−1, 1} are very difficult

101

to detect visually with much higher spikes than the oscilloscope at -10 dB. The spectrum analyzer shows the combination of L1 C/A and L1 P(Y) with the noise floor at
-150 dBW. The side lobes for C/A and P(Y) appear to disappear completely under
the noise floor and even the P(Y) main lobe is undetectable visually.

Figure 59: Oscilloscope in relative volts units over time and spectrum analyzer for
received simulated data at -30 dB SNR. Oscilloscope shows does not show a clean +1
and -1 bits with larger spikes than at -10 dB SNR for the RAV. The spectrum analyzer
shows the combination of L1 C/A and L1 P(Y) with the inclusion of the noise floor
which drowns out the wider bands even more than the -10 dB SNR spectrum analyzer
figure.
As expected, the simulated EAV at -30 dB SNR shows high correlation magnitude
for the correlators after frequency/phase lock as seen in Figure 60. This shows that
synchronization with the incoming signal at -30 dB SNR was achieved allowing the
receiver to generate GNSS observables just as the RAV received at -10 dB SNR.
Visually it is difficult to determine a difference from Figure 55 with RAV at -10 dB
SNR and Figure 61 with EAV at -30 dB SNR for the prompt and late correlators.
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Figure 60: Correlators for Prompt, Early, and Late over time for -30 dB SNR. The
figure shows a larger noise effect for each correlator when compared to the 0 dB
SNR correlators and -10 dB correlators while the average remains roughly the same.
Additionally, the figure shows a high correlation magnitude after achieving phase
lock.
Much like the RAV received at 0 dB SNR and RAV received at -10 dB SNR, the
EAV received at -30 dB shows that after ∼2 seconds, phase lock was achieved for the
simulated code as seen in Figure 61 but with more noise. The noise for the -30 dB
SNR phase lock does not affect the ability to determine the boundaries of C/A and
P(Y).
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Figure 61: Phase Lock Indicator over time for -30 dB SNR. The figure shows that
after lock, the phase lock indicator stays constant at ∼+1 with additional noise,
showing that phase lock has been achieved after 2 seconds of time over the period of
59 seconds.
For the -30 dB EAV simulated data run as seen in Figure 62, the estimated C/N0
average was 44.0 dB-Hz after phase lock. The simulated receiver’s estimated C/N0
appears to still affect the simulated results vs the theoretical results but is much closer
to the expected 47.0 dB-Hz. There is a similar offset for the -10 dB SNR RAV and
the -30 dB SNR EAV simulations.
Finally, after frequency/phase lock, the EAV can begin to store the estimated
P(Y) chips so the match percent for the simulated data can be determined. Figure 63
shows that the data is within the expected CER for -30 dB SNR which is estimated to
be around 45-48%. The CER is at 47.2% on average over a period of 57 seconds. This
shows that for a -30 dB SNR EAV the estimated P(Y) chips will be correct ∼53% of
the time. Though this appears to be low, it shows that with a signal present, there
are still correct bits present.
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Figure 62: Estimated C/N0 for simulated data for -30 dB SNR. This figure shows for
the simulated data that the average C/N0 is 44.0 dB-Hz.

Figure 63: Match Percent for -30 dB SNR after Frequency/Phase Lock. This figure
shows the average Chip Success Rate is 52.8% for -30dB SNR.
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4.2

Live-sky Data Collection
Data collection for the live-sky data was performed at Wright-Patterson Air Force

Base, Ohio using a 3-meter parabolic antenna by Air Force Research Laboratory
(AFRL). The data was collected for a period of just under 60 seconds for Pseudorandom Noise (PRN) 1 and PRN 7 GPS satellites with a 16-bit data collector on 16
July 2020. During the portion of the research that began to use the live-sky data,
the setup for AFRL was completely upgraded and there was no information on the
replaced parabolic antenna.
The live-sky data is used to replace the satellite simulation portion of the Objectoriented MATLABTM code. This still allows the live-sky data to go through all other
portions of the MATLABTM code to remain consistent and allowed for adding noise
to the live-sky data to modify the data to match the expected SNR for RAV and
EAV.
Though it is expected that the 3 m parabolic dish would provide a 30 dB gain,
without the additional information, it was necessary to calibrate the received live-sky
data. To accomplish the calibration, the simulated data was run for multiple SNR
runs where the noise was changed in each trial run over a period of 59 seconds. This
created a C/N0 curve based on the thermal noise. The live-sky data collected was run
with the software receiver to determine the average C/N0 for 59 seconds. Figure 64
shows the C/N0 for both the simulated runs and the live-sky data. This plot shows
that the live-sky data’s C/N0 matches the simulated C/N0 at -9 dB SNR.
Figure 65 shows the oscilloscope and spectral analyzer for the simulated data set
at -9dB SNR and the received live-sky data. The performance of the oscilloscope and
spectral analyzer appear to be similar.
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Figure 64: Live Data Calibration using Estimated C/N0 per Thermal Noise. The
Figure shows the C/N0 for simulated data with changing SNR and the C/N0 for the
received live-sky data.
With a front-end bandwidth of 50 MHz and a temperature of 25°C, the thermal
noise is -127 dBW as determined in Equation (25) [12].
Let:
Bandwidth (B) = 50MHz
Boltzman constant (k) = 1.3807−23
Ambient Temperature (T) = 25°C + 273.15 = 298.15
where,

PT hermalN oise = 10 ∗ log10 (k ∗ B ∗ T )
(25)
= −126.86dBW or − 127dBW
The data from Figure 64 can be used to determine the SNR from the live sky data
and determine the observed antenna gain as seen in Equation (28).
Let:
107

Figure 65: Simulated and Live-sky Calibrated Scopes. The Figure shows the oscilloscope and spectral analyzer for the (a) simulated data set at -9dB SNR and the (b)
received live-sky data. The oscilloscope and spectral analyzer appear to have similar
performance.
SNR = -9 dB
Pnoise =-127 dBW
where,

SN R =

Psignal
Pnoise

= Psignal(dB) − Pnoise(dB)
Psignal(dB) = SN R + Pnoise(dB)

(26)

= −9 + (−127(dBW ))
= −136dBW
From the GPS ICD [40], the received minimum signal power is -158.5 dBW. Using
the minimum signal power, the observed antenna gain can be calculated as seen in
Equation (27).
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Let:
Psignal(dB) = -158.5 dBW

where,

GainAntenna = Psignal(dB) − Pnoise(dB)
= −136dBW –(−158.5dBW )

(27)

= 20.5dB
Equation (27) shows that the observed antenna gain from the live-sky data was
20.5 dB. The expected antenna gain for a 3-meter antenna is expected to be 30.5 dB
as seen in Equation (28).
Let:
Antenna Diameter (D) = 3 meters
Frequency (λ) = 1.5 GHz
Efficiency (k) = 55%

where,

GainAntenna(dB) = 10 ∗ log10 (k ∗ (

πD 2
))
λ

(28)

= 30.8dBor 30.5dB
This shows that there is a 10 dB loss that could be due to having lower antenna
efficiency or due to the gain from the low-noise amplifier (LNA). This gives two options
to calibrating the live-sky data. The data can be adjusted by adding Additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN) to match the 20 dB antenna gain as described in Chapter III
or to also account for the same 10dB loss that was seen with the live-sky data. For
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this research, the -10 dB loss will be used as a real-world example. Therefore, the
noise that will be added to the live-sky data seen in Equation (29).
Let:
ObservedGainAntenna = 20.5dB
ExpectedGain3−meterAntenna = 30.5dB
ExpectedGain1−meterAntenna = 20dB
ExpectedGainT ypicalGN SS = 0dB

where,

Callibrationf or − 10dB :
SN Rloss = ObservedGainAntenna − ExpectedGain3−meterAntenna
= 20.5dB − 30.5dB = −10dB
Callibration20dB = ExpectedGain1−meterAntenna − ObservedGainAntenna
= 20dB − 20.5dB = −0.5dB
T otalCallibration20dB = SN Rloss + Callibration20dB
(29)
= −10db + −0.5dB = −10.5dB
Callibrationf or − 30dB :
Callibration0dB = ExpectedGainT ypicalGN SS − ObservedGainAntenna
= 0dB − 20.5dB = −20.5dB
T otalCallibration20dB = SN Rloss + Callibration20dB
= −10db + −20.5dB = −30.5dB
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4.3

Validation with modified Live-sky
As determined from the previous section, the live-sky data does not directly match

the theoretical data due to either the efficiency of the antenna and/or the LNA.
After the calibration of the data, which is an offset to the live-sky data’s SNR, the
focus is on how RAV/EAV simulations perform on live-sky data. For the live-sky
data, AWGN will be inserted to degrade the SNR to the desired SNR (dB). From
the previous section, it is shown that the live-sky data is not directly matching the
expected results from a 3-meter dish. For the purposes of this research, the Live-sky
data will be assumed to be 0dB to account for th possibility of the same offset in a
real-world scenario.

4.3.1

Live-sky Simulation of RAV Estimated from a 0dB SNR Signal

With no added noise to the live-sky data, the data is expected to be at 0 dB SNR
for the 3-meter dish. From the previous section, this is not entirely the case, but for
the purposes of this research, this will be assumed to be the 0dB scenario. For this
step, there will be no added AWGN to get a baseline of the live data and should
perform somewhere between the results seen in the simulated data at 0 dB SNR and
-10 dB SNR. Again, this would be the data for a reference system using a 3-meter
parabolic dish. Figure 66 shows the oscilloscope and spectrum analyzer for the RAV
received at 0 dB SNR simulation. From the oscilloscope, the symbols of  {−1, 1}
visually look similar to the oscilloscope of the simulated 0 dB SNR scenario, though
there is a higher overall voltage. This increased relative voltage is most likely due to
the antenna system’s powered gain used to collect the live-sky data. The spectrum
analyzer shows the combination of L1 C/A, L1 P(Y), and L1 M-Code, which differs
from the simulated data with the inclusion of L1 M-Code. Since there are satellites
that do not have the inclusion of L1 M-code in orbit, the simulation is still a probable
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outcome and additionally does not affect the results.

Figure 66: Oscilloscope in relative volts units over time and spectrum analyzer for
received like-sky data at 0 dB SNR. Oscilloscope shows does not show a clean +1 and
-1 bits but matches the 0dB SNR simulated data but with higher relative voltages.
The spectrum analyzer shows the combination of L1 C/A, L1 P(Y), and L1 M-Code
with the inclusion of the noise floor. There are a few spikes that are estimated to be
local signals that were picked up by the antenna.
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The live-sky data RAV simulation for a received signal at 0 dB SNR shows high
correlation magnitude for the correlators after frequency/phase lock as seen in Figure 67 and matches the simulated data received at 0 dB SNR but with more variation.
This shows that synchronization with the incoming signal was achieved allowing the
receiver to generate GNSS observables.

Figure 67: Correlators for Prompt, Early, and Late over time for 0 dB SNR for
live-sky data. The figure shows varying noise effects for each correlator and a high
correlation magnitude after achieving phase lock.
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Unlike the simulated data, the live-sky data takes ∼6 seconds to achieve phase
lock as seen in Figure 68. This means that the L1 C/A and L1 P(Y) boundaries are
aligned for the live-sky data allowing for proper estimation of the P(Y) chips with
noise.

Figure 68: Phase Lock Indicator over time for 0 dB SNR for live-sky data. The
figure shows that after phase lock, the phase lock indicator stays constant at +1,
showing that phase lock has been achieved after 6 seconds of time over the period of
59 seconds.
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For the 0 dB SNR live-sky data run, the estimated C/N0 average was 66.93 dBHz after phase lock as seen in Figure 69. The live-sky receiver’s estimated C/N0
average ended up being non-linear just as the simulated receiver in previous sections
if the SNR was high enough. For all other values, the estimated C/N0 values appear
correct with a +- 2 dB offset which is most likely due to the antenna system’s gain.
Since the research being focused on RAV received at -10 dB SNR and EAV received
at -30 dB SNR makes this not a major concern and this is a possible variable for
different system designs. With 0 dB SNR at a 50 MHz bandwidth with a known
max C/N0 is expected to be 77.0 dB-Hz and with the simulated data at 67.7 dB-Hz,
the results are as expected based on the mentioned irregularities on the MATLABTM
implementation’s estimation of C/N0 .

Figure 69: Estimated C/N0 for live-sky data for 0 dB SNR. This figure shows for the
live-sky data that the average C/N0 after frequency/phase lock is 66.93 dB-Hz.
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Figure 70 shows that there is a low CER for the 0 dB SNR live-sky data. The
CER is low at 4.6% on average over a period of 53 seconds after the 6 seconds needed
to achieve frequency/phase lock. This means that at 0 dB, the RAV estimates the
P(Y) chips correctly ∼95% of the time. When compared to the simulated data at 0
dB SNR which was at ∼98%, this matches as expected. One thing to note is that
the ‘reference’ from the live-sky data is being compared to the data received with
no additional noise. For a ‘reference’ to match around 99.9% from the satnav signal,
the reference station would require an antenna with ∼10dB SNR. This assumption is
used to determine the CER for all live-sky data. As explained in more detail later,
this does not affect the DAS effectiveness, but is used to analyze performance based
on the live-sky data.

Figure 70: Relative Match Percent for live-sky data for 0dB SNR after frequency/phase lock. This figure shows the average CER is 4.6% and CSR is 95.4% for 0dB
SNR.
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4.3.2

Live-sky Simulation of RAV Estimated from a -10 dB SNR Signal

As mentioned, RAV for this research is achieved by the reference station using a
1-meter parabolic antenna with a 20 dB gain. To test for RAV based on this design,
the noise for the live-sky data was adjusted to provide a -10 dB SNR and consider the
calibration factor of -0.5 dB. This is still intended to provide a CER of around 20-30%
as expected for the simulated data. Figure 71 shows the oscilloscope and spectrum
analyzer with a signal received at -10 dB SNR. From the oscilloscope, the symbols
of  {−1, 1} are difficult to detect visually with higher spikes than the oscilloscope
at 0dB SNR and matches the results from the -10 dB SNR simulation data. The
spectrum analyzer shows the combination of L1 C/A, L1 P(Y), and L1 M-Code with
the noise floor at -150 dBW after calibration of the live-sky data. Much of the side
lobes for C/A and P(Y) are difficult to detect or disappear completely under the
noise floor. The main lobes for L1 C/A, L1 P(Y), and L1 M-Code are still visually
apparent.
As expected, the live-sky data receiver at -10 dB SNR has high correlation magnitude for the correlators after frequency/phase lock and matched the same trend as
the simulated data. This again shows that synchronization with the incoming signal
at -10 dB SNR was achieved. As with the RAV live-sky data simulation received at
0 dB SNR, the RAV live-sky signal received at -10 dB SNR simulation shows that
after ∼6 seconds phase lock was achieved.
For the -10 dB received live-sky data, the estimated C/N0 average was 63.29 dBHz after phase lock as seen in Figure 72. The simulated receiver’s estimated C/N0
appears to still affect the live-sky results vs the theoretical results but is much closer
to the expected 67.0 dB-Hz with the known offset as explained previously.
Finally, after frequency/phase lock, the RAV can begin to store the estimated

117

Figure 71: Oscilloscope in relative volts units over time and spectrum analyzer for
received like-sky data at -10 dB SNR. Oscilloscope shows does not show a clean
+1 and -1 bits but matches the -10 dB SNR simulated data and the voltages when
compared to the 0dB SNR live-sky data also increased. The spectrum analyzer shows
the combination of L1 C/A, L1 P(Y), and L1 M-Code with the inclusion of the noise
floor at ∼150 dBW. Most of the large local signals that were picked up by the antenna
are still present.
P(Y) chips and the match percent for the RAV simulated live-sky data. Figure 73
shows that the live-sky data is within the expected CER for a -10 dB SNR received
signal and matches what was discovered with the -10 dB SNR received simulated
data. The CER is at 24.1% on average over a period of 53 seconds. This shows that
for a RAV received at -10 dB SNR the estimated P(Y) chips will be correct or have
a CSR of ∼76% of the time just as the simulated data.
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Figure 72: Estimated C/N0 for live-sky data for -10 dB SNR. This figure shows for
the live-sky data that the average C/N0 after frequency/phase lock is 63.29 dB-Hz.
4.3.3

Live-sky Simulation of EAV Estimated from a -30dB SNR Signal

EAV for this research is intended to be the vector in the PU that has DAS implemented so that it can receive the estimated encrypted signal from RAV and correlate
the vectors to be measured against a threshold. The noise for the live-sky data was
adjusted by adding AWGN to provide a -30 dB SNR. Figure 74 shows the oscilloscope
and spectrum analyzer with a signal received at -30 dB SNR. From the oscilloscope,
the symbols of  {−1, 1} are very difficult to detect visually with much higher spikes
than the oscilloscope at -10 dB SNR for the live-sky data. The spectrum analyzer
shows the combination of L1 C/A, L1 P(Y), and L1 M-Code with the noise floor at
-127 dBW after calibration of the live-sky data. The side lobes for L1 C/A and L1
P(Y) appear to disappear completely under the noise floor and even the L1 P(Y) and
L1 M-Code main lobes are undetectable visually.
The live-sky data EAV simulation with a received signal at -30 dB SNR has high
correlation magnitude for the correlators after frequency/phase lock and matched the
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Figure 73: Match Percent for live-sky data for -10 dB SNR after frequency/phase
lock. This figure shows the average CER is 24.1% and CSR is 75.9% for -10 dB SNR.
same trend as the -30 dB SNR simulated data. This shows that synchronization with
the incoming signal at -30 dB SNR was achieved. As with the 0 dB SNR and -10 dB
SNR received signal RAV live-sky data simulations, the -30 dB SNR received signal
RAV live-sky data shows that after ∼6 seconds phase lock was achieved.
For the -30 dB live-sky data, the estimated C/N0 average was 47.13 dB-Hz after
phase lock as seen in Figure 75. The simulated receiver’s estimated C/N0 is close to
the theoretical C/N0 of 47.0 dB-Hz.
Finally, the estimated P(Y) chips are stored and the match percent for the EAV
live-sky data is estimated. Figure 76 shows that the live-sky data is within the
expected CER for a signal received at -30 dB SNR and matches what was discovered
with the signal received at -30 dB SNR for the simulated data. This is where there
will be a large drop in CER but should remain a few percentages below 50%. The
CER is at 47.1% on average over a period of 53 seconds. This shows that for a -30
dB SNR received signal, EAV will estimate P(Y) chips having a CSR of ∼53% of the
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Figure 74: Oscilloscope in relative volts units over time and spectrum analyzer for
received like-sky data at -30 dB SNR. Oscilloscope shows does not show a clean +1 and
-1 bits but matches the -30 dB SNR simulated data and the voltages when compared
to the -10 dB SNR live-sky data also largely increased. The spectrum analyzer shows
the combination of L1 C/A, L1 P(Y), and L1 M-Code with the inclusion of the noise
floor at ∼130 dB. Most of the signal and the sidelobes besides L1 C/A and possible
L1 P(Y) are visually lost in the noise floor. A strong spike from a local signal can
still be seen.
time just as the simulated data received at -30 dB SNR.
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Figure 75: Estimated C/N0 for live-sky data for -30 dB SNR. This figure shows for
the live-sky data that the average C/N0 after frequency/phase lock is 47.13 dB-Hz.

Figure 76: Match Percent for live-sky data for -30 dB SNR after frequency/phase
lock. This figure shows the average CER is 47.1% and CSR is 52.9% for -30dB SNR.
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4.4

RAV and EAV Correlation Values
The next part of the research is to test if the threshold determined in Chapter IV

works properly for both the simulated and the calibrated live-sky RS and PU. This
is accomplished by correlating the estimated P(Y) chips from RAV and EAV for an
Authentication Vector size of 409200 over a period of 10 seconds. The data was
collected for a period of 10 seconds but was only testing against the threshold for a
authentication vector collected over 40 ms. The 40 ms vector was constantly correlated to simulated running multiple trials. Table 11 below is to simplify the results
for the simulated and calibrated live-sky data that was previously discovered.
Table 11: Collection of RAV/EAV results from simulated data and calibrated live-sky
data

The estimated P(Y) chips were stored for a period of 40 ms and constantly checked
over a period of 10 seconds. Since there are 10230 P(Y) chips in 1 ms, this means
409200 chips were stored. The threshold determined from the detection statistics
in Chapter IV did not account for a Front-End factor, so using the same logic the
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Front-End factor can be determined.
Let:
y1ms denote ”mag and sign”,
y1s denote ”sign only”,
n is a form of noise or residual error
a is the Front-End factor
y1ms = ay1s + n
where,

E[x1 ∗ y1ms ] = E[ax1 ∗ ay1s ] + E[ax1 ∗ n]
= aE[x1 ∗ y1s ] + aE[x1 ] ∗ E[n]

(30)

= aE[x1 ∗ y1s ]
For Chi-squared distributions the correlations are squared resulting in a FrontEnd factor of a2 . The Front-End factor was estimated by the ratio of magnitude from
statistics data and the estimated chips from the receiver. It was estimated the FrontEnd factor is ∼9.8 and when squared results in roughly two orders of magnitude
difference. Therefore, the results performed from the simulations will match the
results of the statistics.

4.4.1

Simulated RAV/EAV Correlation Results

The first test was with the correct GNSS signal being received by the PU. Figure 77 shows the correlation between the -10 dB SNR received RAV from the reference
station and the -30 dB SNR received EAV from the PU. As a result of having the
correct signal present, the correlation values are above the threshold. With the correlation values being above the threshold, the EAV can determine the correct signal
is present and therefore authenticate the signal from that satellite.
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Figure 77: Correlation Values for 409200 P(Y) Authentication Vector sequences for
simulated RAV/EAV data. This figure shows the correlation between the -10 dB
SNR RAV and the -30 dB SNR EAV in which the correct signal is present for EAV.
As a result of having the correct signal present, the correlation values are above the
threshold.
The next test was with an incorrect GNSS signal being received by the PU. This
was accomplished for this scenario by making the signal all noise and resulted in a
CER of 50.0%. Figure 82 shows the correlation between the -10 dB SNR received
RAV from the reference station and the -30 dB SNR received EAV from the PU. As
a result of having an incorrect signal present, the correlation values are below the
threshold. With the correlation values below the threshold, the PU can determine
the received signal is not authenticate and reject all signals coming from that source.
Finally, a simulation was run to test a correct GNSS signal being received by an
PU at the minimum SNR based on the threshold and authentication vector length.
Figure 82 shows the correlation between the -10 dB SNR received RAV from the
reference station and the -33 dB SNR received EAV from the PU. As a result of
having the correct signal present, the correlation values are above the threshold. A
SNR of -34 dB for the EAV receiver resulted in ∼40% of the correlation values below
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Figure 78: Correlation Values for 409200 P(Y) Authentication Vector sequences for
simulated RAV/EAV data. This figure shows the correlation between the -10 dB SNR
RAV and the -30 dB SNR EAV in which the correct signal is not present for EAV.
As a result of not having the correct signal present, the correlation values are below
the threshold.
the threshold over the 10 second timeframe.

4.4.2

Calibrated Live-sky RAV/EAV Correlation Results

For the calibrated live-sky data, again the first test was with the correct GNSS
signal being received by the PU. Figure 80 shows the correlation between the -10 dB
SNR received RAV from the RS and the -30 dB SNR received EAV from the PU.
As a result of having the correct signal present, the correlation values are above the
threshold. Therefore, the PU can determine the correct signal is present and therefore
authenticate the signal from that satellite just as with the simulated data with the
correct signal present.
The next test was with an incorrect GNSS signal being received by the PU. This
was accomplished for this scenario by selecting an arbitrary random sequence received
by the PU and resulted in a CER of 50.0%. Figure 81 shows the correlation between
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Figure 79: Correlation Values for 409200 P(Y) Authentication Vector sequences for
simulated RAV/EAV data. This figure shows the correlation between the -10 dB
SNR RAV and the -33 dB SNR EAV in which the correct signal is present for EAV.
As a result of having the correct signal present, the correlation values are above the
threshold.
the -10 dB SNR received RAV from the reference station and the -30 dB SNR received
EAV from the PU. As a result of having an incorrect signal present, the correlation
values are below the threshold. With the correlation values below the threshold,
the EAV receiver can determine the received signal is not authenticate and reject all
signals coming from that source.
To conclude for the live-sky data correlation between RAV and EAV, a simulation was run to test a correct GNSS signal being received by EAV at the minimum
SNR based on the threshold and authentication vector length. Figure 82 shows the
correlation between the -10 dB SNR received RAV from the reference station and
the -35 dB SNR received EAV from the PU. As a result of having the correct signal
present, the correlation values are mostly above the threshold with a few values that
are below the threshold. Based on the algorithm in the PU that constantly checks
over time a signal that was determined non-authentic by a slight margin or using
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Figure 80: Correlation Values for 409200 P(Y) Authentication Vector sequences for
calibrated live-sky RAV/EAV data. This figure shows the correlation between the
-10 dB SNR RAV and the -30 dB SNR EAV in which the correct signal is present
for EAV. As a result of having the correct signal present, the correlation values are
above the threshold.
more time to store data than 40 ms, the EAV can be used to determine the received
signal is authentic and accept all signals coming from that satellite. The results ended
up performing near the -33 dB simulated data due to many unknown variables when
calibrating the live-sky data.
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Figure 81: Correlation Values for 409200 P(Y) Authentication Vector sequences for
simulated RAV/EAV data. This figure shows the correlation between the -10 dB SNR
RAV and the -30 dB SNR EAV in which the correct signal is not present for EAV.
As a result of not having the correct signal present, the correlation values are below
the threshold.

Figure 82: Correlation Values for 409200 P(Y) Authentication Vector sequences for
calibrated live-sky RAV/EAV data. This figure shows the correlation between the
-10 dB SNR RAV and the -35 dB SNR EAV in which the correct signal is present
for EAV. As a result of having the correct signal present, the correlation values are
mostly above the threshold with some values falling below the threshold.
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4.5

Analysis of Results for GNSS
The results discovered for DAS in this chapter were based on the GPS L1 C/A and

GPS L1 P(Y) code. Since current GNSS signals follow a similar signal structure with a
civilian or open signal and an encrypted signal that is transmitted synchronously, the
results discovered will also work based on any GNSS satellite that follows that signal
structure. An example alternate GNSS satellite that would provide similar results
would be Galileo with their signal structures discussed in Section 2.2. Additionally,
even GPS L1 C/A and GPS L1 M-Code can be used to determine authenticity based
on the signal structure properties. Similarly, Beidou GNSS systems have an open
signal and an encrypted signal, but was not covered in Chapter II. The only change
in the results found from the simulations from this research would be based on the
code frequency to determine the boundaries and the antenna performance change
based on the center frequency.
The results for the system based on Chapter III detection and storage results
and Chapter IV simulation and live-sky receiver results is that DAS is capable to be
performed based on those results. There are still however a few requirements that
have not been discussed. These are the data transmit speed and the packaging/depackaging timeframes as well as transmitting times. If the system were to use a
tactical data link such as Link-16 that is capable of a data rate of 107.52 kilobits per
second (kbps) or 13.44 kilobyte per second (kB/s), it would mean the data transmission time would be ∼3.8s for a single satellite navigation (satnav) signal. Due to
less than 1 second vector creations, packaging, de-packaging, and correlation time,
this is very achievable within the 6 second frames (GPS subframe timing). There are
much higher data rates that could be used that are upwards of 21.42 megabits per
second (Mbps) or 2.68 megabytes per second (MB/s) [41]. If using the 2 Mbps or 250
kB/s operating data rate for a high gain Common Data Link (CDL), this would take
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∼0.6 seconds for three satnav signals transmitted at one time [42]. With the massive
difference in data transmission rates, an assumption/requirement of 1 second data
transmission can be made. Therefore, an example of this can be viewed in Figure 83.
This shows there is still a lot of free time within the 6 second window to balance the
data transmitting time and/or the authentication vector length/time.

Figure 83: RAV/EAV Timing Diagram. This figure shows possible timings for DAS
to include timing to create the Authentication Vector, Packaging, De-packaging, and
Correlation times.
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V. Conclusions

5.1

Conclusions of Research
The research outlined in this thesis involved developing a method to provide confi-

dence in the authenticity of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signal. This
research proved a proof-of-concept system where sending 40 ms of satnav data validates the signal to 95% confidence using only a 1 meter dish. This allows the receiver
to be able to continue to provide Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) accuracy
should a non-authentic signal be detected by rejecting non-authentic signals. The thesis demonstrated that Delayed Authentication System (DAS) can be implementable
today with the current signal structure as explained in Chapter II. This makes DAS
different from the signal authentication systems that are expected to be available
sometime in the future since DAS relies on currently existing GNSS signal structures.
This has been proven using software receivers implemented in MATLABTM with both
simulated satellite data and live-sky data.
To reiterate, DAS is designed using a Reference Authentication Vector (RAV) and
an Estimated Authentication Vector (EAV) as discussed in Chapter III. The objective
is to estimate the encrypted chip values while tracking the civilian component. This
is achieved by synchronization of the carrier phase and time of the open signals by
using the civilian code generator to determine the boundaries of the encrypted signal.
The participating user(s) (PU) establishes signal authenticity by correlating the RAV
received by the reference station (RS) with its EAV produced for the same Global
Positioning System (GPS) time epoch. If the PU is tracking the authentic signal, then
this correlation will be relatively high – consistent with the statistics associated with
the received signal powers at the RS and PU. To determine authenticity of the satnav
signal, a detection statistic was set up to determine the minimum requirements of the
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system for accepatable performance following the methods used in GNSS receivers.
The metrics discussed in this section are based off a total of 100,000 Monte Carlo
executions to determine the impact of different variables. These runs focused on the
probability of detection based on a minimum probability of false detection of 0.001.
These trials were run for Signal-to-Noise ratio (SNR) values of 0 dB, -10 dB, and -30
dB for an error free RAV. Additionally, trials were run for SNR values of 0 dB, -10 dB,
and -30 dB for a -10 dB SNR RAV based on achieving a ∼20 dB gain from a 1-meter
parabolic antenna. As discussed, this antenna design was used to achieve a signal with
a low chip error rate (CER) and to keep costs down as 1-meter parabolic antennas are
widely available (for example, consumer satellite television and broadband internet
applications). These metrics provide the minimum system requirements based on the
above trials providing vector length requirements and memory requirements for DAS.
The results of 100,000 Monte Carlo simulations to determine the minimum system
requirements based on the current DAS design are as follows: the optimum vector
length using a 1-meter dish antenna was 409,200 providing a probability of detection of 95.7%. The threshold value for an authentic or non-authentic satnav signal
is ∼4.47E+09 for the 409,200 vector length. The threshold value will change for
different vector lengths. The thresholds for these results were determined based on
the minimum signal performance of GPS L1 and GPS L2 and are applicable to other
satnav signals where there is a civilian component and an encrypted component on
the same carrier. The threshold value also does not account for a front-end factor
to the magnitude of the correlation from the detection results. This is discussed in
more detail in Section 4.2 and resulted in two orders of magnitude difference. The
memory allocation required for DAS is expected to be ∼306 KB if 6 satellite navigation (satnav) signals are to be correlated for a length up to 40 milliseconds. This can
be optimized based on cost allocation and time constraints. The research provided

133

additional memory allocation information in Section 3.4.1.
DAS was tested with simulated and live-sky data based on the previous metrics.
Both the simulated and live-sky data performed as expected and within an acceptable margin of error when the results were compared between the two simulations.
The simulated receiver results for GPS L1 P(Y) chips were estimated based on the
boundaries determined by GPS L1 C/A chips. The receiver was able to determine
an authentic GPS L1 P(Y) signal vs. a non-authentic GPS L1 P(Y) signal with a
two orders of magnitude correlation gain being achieved by the receiver gain for a
chi-squared correlation. The test was run for a period of 10 seconds based on the
assumed PU that determines the EAV having a SNR of -30 dB. It was also shown
that a PU with a slightly lower SNR than -30 dB can also perform the authentication
from this method but may require the use of an algorithm. This algorithm can be
used to detect and determine the percentage of the correlation values that are above
threshold and with a determine authenticity.

5.2

Significance of Research
The design of DAS from this research provides a baseline for technology that is

available today with minimal cost based on not requiring to implement a new GNSS
signal. This allows for civilian signal authentication to be implemented quickly and
at a low cost. The design methodology and contributions through analysis of the
RAV and the EAV will hopefully serve as the baseline to DAS being implemented at
the hardware level. This research proves that it is currently possible to authenticate a
GNSS signal by estimating the encrypted chips and correlating between the RAV and
the receiver based on a predetermined threshold. This research also explains how this
information can work on different GNSS signals providing a user increased confidence
in the PNT solution. This can be used for both military applications where using
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military receivers is not applicable as well as for civilian applications where there
are currently no signal authentication methods available. This can reduce the effects
of GNSS spoofing for the civilian application as described in Section 1.1.2 and in
Section 2.4.

5.3

Recommendations for Future Research
In order to conclude the research for DAS, a hardware implementation is needed

with a reference station that has a 1-meter parabolic antenna that stores the encrypted
chips and sends the timestamped RAV to PU through a side channel. At the same
time, the PU timestamps and stores the encrypted chips at the EAV and correlates
with the received RAV. Performing this work at the hardware level will validate the
results of this research.
Additional research in the algorithms for the authentication is also required to
further optimize performance as well as to meet cost requirements. DAS can be
performed with either one signal at a time for each Pseudorandom Noise (PRN) source
or can compute multiple PRN sources at a time. The next phase of the research can
focus on achieving a hardware solution of DAS with implementing different algorithms
for the memory requirement as a cost vs. performance comparison. Another part of
the research could be on the use of a phased-array antenna to replace the 1-meter
parabolic antenna.
Another study can be on how the RS and the PU can be implemented in the
field. The focus could be on the reference station being a stationary platform such
as stationary antennas where important market transactions are finalized. Another
focus could be as a moving platform such as a drone or vehicle that can support a
20dB gain antenna. The next step would be about how those types of RAV platforms
would affect either a relatively stationary PU or a high velocity PU such as an aircraft.
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The goal would be to develop optimum designs that would meet system requirements
based on different GNSS applications.

5.4

Summary
The goal of this research was to demonstrate a proof-of-concept system using

a functioning software GNSS receiver that can authenticate the received signal by
exploiting the known signal structures. The research proved that with some the
assumptions discussed in Section 2.5.3, satnav signal authentication can be achieved
based on the current signal properties implemented today. The next effort for signal
authentication is to produce a system of receivers that can estimate the encrypted
signal and communicate between each other based on the design of a reference station
to produce the RAV and PU to produce the EAV. This will enable civilian satnav
signal authentication with current operational GNSS satellites.
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Appendix A. Additional Results
Figure 84 shows to get an accurate Monte Carlo output, the trial size of 50 thousand is significant to reduce computation power / time. When zoomed in, it was
noted that the 100k and beyond had a much tighter grouping and therefore 100k
Monte Carlo Trials was used for all of the probabilities.

Figure 84: Multiple Trial Runs for Correlation (zoomed out). Zoomed out, it is
difficult to see the minor differences from the 50K, 100k, 1000K, and 3000K trial
runs.
Figure 86 shows the different types of correlation methods that were developed
and tested in Monte Carlo trials to determine the differences of each method. The
first method tested are the lines with the circled data points. This method is the Full
Segment method where there are 2N correlations where N is the segment size. This
method causes the number of correlations to increase exponentially and therefore
becomes very demanding as the segment size increases. The next method is the
subsegment method which uses a base method to be used as the full correlation, but
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Figure 85: Multiple Trial Runs for Correlation (zoomed in).
the main segment is initially split up and then added together. In other words, for a
segment size of 10 using a subsegment size of 5, there will be two 5 segment size signals
being correlated and added together based on the number of passed correlations. This
would result in 2 ∗ 25 correlations vs 210 correlations. Over time, this method saves a
lot of computational time and memory and performs close to the full segment method,
after about 40% of the segment size is pass, but when less correlations are passed,
it becomes less accurate. The last method used is the Simplified method or N+1
method. This method takes the segment size and adds 1 additional correlation to
account for the 0 correlation value.
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Figure 86: Match Percent for Different Correlation Methods studied in this research
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Appendix B. Additional information for early research
This was done to investigate a proof of concept with a primary focus on evaluating
chip estimation error statistics for various independent variables. These variables were
Block size, SNR, Trial Size, and Sample Size. This was done for a static simulation
to reduce the effects of have dynamic motion on the signal. Later, this will also be
accomplished for a simulation where there is dynamic motion from the satellite.
The code was run for varying levels of noise and the number of bits that are to be
compared which the results can be seen in Table 12 below. As a result, the change
in the number of chips that is being compared had no effect on the Bit Error Rate
(BER).
Table 12: BER for different Block sizes, SNR ratios, and Trial size for Overall Chip
Error Rate

While Table 12 showing that the number of chips compared did not affect the
BER, I tested for varying sampling rates as seen in the table below. As a result, the
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higher the sampling rate output a lower BER.
It was determined that the BER was the same due to the method that was used
to correlate the incoming signal. This will be discussed in the next topic regarding
different correlation methods. The method used for the simulation is later being
referred to as the Sub Segment Method.
Table 13: BER for different Sampling Rates and SNR ratios

As seen in Figure 87, the saw tooth plot shows the highest value as the best
correlation for the input signal as recorded by the receiver. Due to noise, the correct
signal may not be the highest correlation value at -10dB. Therefore, the concept
is to choose a certain number of highest correlation values. This amount will be
dependent on memory and therefore would be derived later to determine the most
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efficient amount.

Figure 87: Correlation of a segment size of 5
Figure 88 shows the relationship between passing a specific number of correlations
vs a threshold value for a given segment size.
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Figure 88: Detection Statistic for Mean Ratio Correct Chips
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Appendix C. Additional Proof of Phase Alignment

Figure 89: I and Q phase for 1ms of data for 10dB SNR (Out of Phase). This figure
shows simulated data with L1 C/A and L1 P(Y) that is not phase aligned.
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Figure 90: I and Q phase for 1ms of data for 10dB SNR (In Phase). This figure shows
simulated data with L1 C/A and L1 P(Y) that is phase aligned.
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